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AFIT/GOR/ENS/04-10 
Abstract 
 
The forces at play in reconstruction operations are a complex system of time 
phased interlocking cause and effect relationships that are not thoroughly understood. A 
model capable of capturing the general dynamics involved in post-conflict reconstruction 
would provide insight to decision makers regarding potential policy alternatives. This 
research effort demonstrates the viability of using systems dynamics modeling techniques 
to simulate the establishment of public order and safety in a post-conflict reconstruction 
operation (Phase IV operations). A high level generic framework is developed that can be 
used as a general template for modeling post-conflict reconstruction. It is then 
demonstrated with a notional test case based on the OIF AOR. 
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MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Background 
           The term post-conflict reconstruction denotes the process of putting the pieces of 
civil society back together after a conflict.  It includes the rebuilding of both physical 
infrastructure and the rebuilding of the intangible socioeconomic institutions that make 
civilized society possible (Harme and Sullivan,2002:89).  The establishment of the rule of 
law, good governance, and social and economic well being falls under the purview of 
post-conflict reconstruction (Harme and Sullivan, 2002:89).  Information on post-conflict 
reconstruction spans the literature on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, nation building, 
and stability operations (Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, Jones, Lal,  Rathmell, Swanger, and 
Timilsina, 2003:1).  
The United States launched its first large scale efforts at post-conflict 
reconstruction in Germany and Japan following the Second World War (Dobbins et al., 
2003:xiii).  The result of the efforts of the U.S. and its allies were stable and prosperous 
democracies in both Germany and Japan.  The success of these operations demonstrated 
that post-conflict reconstruction could succeed, that democracy was transferable, and that 
military forces could be used to underpin rapid, fundamental, and enduring societal 
change (Dobbins et al., 2003:xiii). 
 1
 Since the end of the Cold War the United States has become involved in 
increasingly ambitious post-conflict reconstructions (Dobbins et al., 2003:xv).  The rise 
of international terrorism has highlighted the potential threat to U.S. security posed by 
failed or failing states (Harme and Sullivan, 2002:85).  Failed states can be used as 
sanctuaries for terrorists (Harme and Sullivan, 2002:85); it is a stated national security 
objective of the United States to “eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens” (National 
Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003:22).  One way that the international 
community can deny terrorists these safe havens is by intervening and reconstructing an 
effective government in the previously ungoverned territory of a failed state (Harme and 
Sullivan, 2002:88). 
   Success in a post-conflict reconstruction depends on nearly simultaneous 
progress in the four “pillars” of post-conflict reconstruction: (1) security, (2) justice and 
reconciliation, (3) social and economic well-being, and (4) governance and participation 
(Feil, 2002:98).  Progress in all four of these areas is inextricably linked (Feil, 2002:98).  
If progress in one area is to endure it must be accompanied by progress in the other areas.  
Nevertheless, “security, which encompasses collective and individual security to the 
citizenry” and those establishing security, “is the foundation on which success in the 
other issue areas rests” (Feil, 2002:98).    
 The establishment of security in a post-conflict environment is of critical 
importance to the success of a reconstruction operation (Play to Win, 2003:4).  When the 
international community intervenes in a post-conflict environment it is often the security 
vacuum at the heart of the situation that acted as the catalyst for the intervention (Play to 
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Win, 2003:10).  The term security “addresses all aspects of public safety, particularly the 
establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate and 
stable security institutions” (Play to Win, 2003:10). 
Recently the United States has become involved in large scale post-conflict 
reconstructions in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  These operations face the daunting task of 
simultaneously addressing the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction and, in both 
countries, the establishment of security has emerged as a critical issue (Grymes, 
2003:1;United Nations/World Bank, 2003:3).  For instance, in Afghanistan establishing 
security is “the overriding and supreme requirement for continued progress towards 
stability” (Grymes, 2003:1).  Currently, the government of Afghanistan cannot provide its 
population with basic protections and services that the government of a modern nation-
state is expected to provide (Grymes, 2003:7).  A tool that could provide insight to 
decision makers about how to employ their resources more effectively to successfully 
establish security could save money and lives. 
   
Problem Statement 
The forces at play in a post-conflict reconstruction are complex, and do not fall 
under the purview of any single academic discipline.  The study of post-conflict 
reconstruction is inherently interdisciplinary; military theorists, economists, sociologists, 
relief organization personnel, political scientists, and operations research analysts have all 
made contributions to the understanding of post-conflict reconstruction.  Unfortunately, 
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all of the interlocking cause and effect relationships involved in a post-conflict 
reconstruction are not thoroughly understood. 
 A model capable of capturing the dynamics involved in a post-conflict 
reconstruction would be helpful in providing insight to decision makers about what 
policies should be followed to produce a desirable outcome to a post-conflict 
reconstruction.  It could help countries that have been shattered by war to put the pieces 
of civil society back into place, while saving valuable resources such as money and, more 
importantly, lives.  A first step towards developing a comprehensive post-conflict 
reconstruction model would be the development of a model that can simulate the initial 
establishment of security in a post-conflict reconstruction. 
 The overall goal of this research effort was to demonstrate the viability of using 
system dynamics modeling techniques to simulate post-conflict reconstruction.  This was 
done by constructing a general model for simulating the initial establishment of security 
in a post-conflict reconstruction, and then by applying the general model to a notional 
scenario and analyzing the results.   
 
Methodology 
 System dynamics models represent social systems “as flow rates and 
accumulations linked by information feedback loops involving delays and non-linear 
relationships.  Computer simulation is then the means of inferring the time evolutionary 
dynamics endogenously created by such system structures” (Lane, 1997:1037).  This 
research effort explored the previous literature relevant to the simulation of post-conflict 
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reconstruction with such a model.  This includes previous research that has been 
conducted on post-conflict reconstruction itself and on systems dynamics. 
 The exploration of the previous research on post-conflict reconstruction focused 
on studies that have tried to identify or explain the relationships between the influential 
factors that interact in such an operation.  The systems dynamics literature was explored 
for research that provides insight into how apt a system dynamics model is for the 
simulation of post-conflict reconstruction. 
 Based on the previous research done into post-conflict reconstruction, the 
influential factors involved in a post-conflict reconstruction are identified and the 
functional forms of their interactions are suggested.  These factors and functional 
relationships are then used in the creation of a general systems dynamics model for 
simulating post-conflict reconstruction.  This model was then applied to a notional 
scenario based on Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 
Summary 
 This introduction explained the relevance of this research effort and outlined its 
approach.  The relevant literature on nation building and systems dynamics modeling is 
presented in Chapter II.  The methodology for the construction of a general post-conflict 
reconstruction model is discussed in Chapter III.  The general model is then applied to a 
notional scenario in Chapter IV.  Conclusions are drawn and areas for further research are 
identified in Chapter V. 
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 II. Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter provides an overview of the literature relevant to the development of 
a post-conflict reconstruction model.  Concepts of systems dynamics are first introduced.  
Various sources are then summarized to provide insight into the relationships underlying 
the establishment of security in a post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
Systems Dynamics Literature 
 As was mentioned in the first chapter, system dynamics models represent social 
systems as webs of level values and rate of change interconnected by non-linear 
relationships, information feedback loops, and time delays (Lane, 1997:1037).  System 
dynamics modelers build these interconnected webs of level values (i.e., state variables) 
and flow rates (i.e., rates of change) to represent how the various parts of complex 
systems interact with each other.  Once the model is built to represent the complex 
system of interest, computer simulation is used as “the means of inferring the time 
evolutionary dynamics endogenously created by such system structures” (Lane, 
1997:1037). 
 The study of system dynamics owes a great deal to the work of J. W. Forrester.  In 
1961 Forrester effectively founded the study of system dynamics with the publishing of 
his seminal work Industrial Dynamics.   In it, Forrester explained how the operations of a 
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firm can be simulated as a system of level values and flow rates connected by 
information feedback loops (Forrester, 1961:67). 
In Industrial Dynamics Forrester used a generic multistage distribution system as 
the subject of his example model.  The multistage distribution system was modeled as a 
factory, a factory warehouse, a distribution center, and a retail outlet.  Customers order 
goods at the retail outlet and the goods are delivered in one week.  Replacement stock 
orders from the retail outlet to the distribution center take three and one-half weeks to 
process at the retail outlet, one week to fill at the distribution center, and one week to be 
shipped from the distribution center to the retail outlet.  Replacement orders from the 
distribution center to the factory warehouse take two and one-half weeks to process at the 
distribution center one week to fill at the factory warehouse and two weeks to ship to the 
distribution center.  It takes one week to process an order from the factory warehouse to 
the factory and six weeks to change the factory’s production rate (Forrester, 1961:22).  
This system is illustrated by figure 2.1.  
Forrester used this model to simulate how a multistage distribution system 
operates.  He demonstrated that the delays and information feedback loops in the system 
cause long order backlogs and inefficiencies if a mild fluctuation in the customer demand 
of plus or minus 10% from fall to spring is introduced (Forrester, 1961:26). 
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Figure 2.1. Systems Dynamics Model of a Multistage Distribution system 
 
 By simulating the operations of a distribution system in this way Forrester was 
able to demonstrate that the time phased interactions and non-linear relationships that 
often exist in information feedback loop systems can lead to counter-intuitive behavior 
that can be difficult to manage.  In some instances, policies that are implemented based 
on conventional wisdom or their intuitive appeal may end up producing the opposite of 
their intended result.  Industrial Dynamics suggested how these systems can be simulated 
so that better policies can be developed. 
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 In 1969 Forrester expanded the scope of system dynamics with his book Urban 
Dynamics where he applied the tools of system dynamics to the problem of urban 
stagnation (Forrester, 1969:1).  In Urban Dynamics Forrester simulated how a city 
proceeds through stages of rejuvenation and decay in order to determine what policies 
could be followed to encourage revitalization and prevent economic stagnation (Forrester, 
1969:1).  To accomplish this Forrester structured his model as a system where urban 
components of industry, housing, and people interact and develop over time (Forrester, 
1969:1).  This model is far more complex than the relatively simple model employed in 
Industrial Dynamics.  A full discussion of Forrester’s urban dynamics model is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  However, it is important to note what Forrester was able to 
achieve with his urban dynamics model. 
 Using the building blocks of level values, flow rates, information feedback loops, 
and time delays introduced in Industrial Dynamics, Forrester was able to create a model 
of a generic city that was capable of endogenously simulating the dynamics of urban 
decay and revival (Forrester,1969:129 and Lane,1997:1255).  With his model, Forrester 
was able to experiment with various policies and determine what types of programs 
tended to encourage urban renewal.  Forrester’s model provides “powerful insights into 
the structural causes behind urban stagnation” (Lane,1997:1255).  Some critics found 
some of Forrester’s conclusions to be counter-intuitive (Lane,1997:1255).  For example, 
Forrester’s conclusion that, instead of rejuvenating depressed inner cities, a low-cost 
housing construction program actually contributes to urban decline (Forrester, 1969:67).   
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 With the publishing of World Dynamics in 1971, Forrester again demonstrated the 
versatility and usefulness of the system dynamics methodology, by using it to simulate 
the interactions and “mutual interplay between [the world’s] demographic, industrial, and 
agricultural subsystems” (Forrester, 1971:vii).  Before World Dynamics was published 
most studies on the sustainability of world development focused on the isolated effects of 
each of the subsystems (Forrester, 1971:vii).  World Dynamics used the modeling 
techniques of system dynamics to study the interaction of these subsystems to ascertain 
their overall effects on each other, demonstrating that system dynamics was a useful tool 
at synthesizing disparate fields of study into a single model that taken as a whole is 
greater than the sum of its subsystems (Forrester, 1971: vii).     
 Forrester’s work in Urban Dynamics and World Dynamics is highlighted here 
because it illustrates the range of problems to which system dynamics techniques may be 
successfully applied.  System dynamics methods are designed to allow for the simulation 
of complex systems.  These methods are uniquely suited for the simulation of complex 
social systems like the functioning of a government or the dynamics of international 
development (Forrester,1969:107).  Complex social systems are characterized by their 
“interlocking structure of feedback loops” (Forrester,1969:107). They typically are of 
higher order, nonlinear, contain both positive and negative feedback loops, and “bring 
together many factors which, by quirks of history, have been compartmentalized into 
isolated intellectual fields” (Forrester,1969:109). 
 Recently, systems dynamics methods have been applied to the military sphere 
through the Strategic Management System (STRATMAS), a program that uses systems 
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dynamics and other models to improve command and control (Woodcock, 2003:111).  
Woodcock and other researchers involved in the development of STRATMAS have 
identified the need for “more integrated functional and coordinated command processes,” 
and have proposed the use of validated models in support of “rapid situation assessment 
and proactive command and control and crisis management” (Christensson and 
Woodcock,2002:2). 
In a recent paper entitled “Perceptual and Societal Dynamical Models for 
Compliance and Peace Building” Woodcock argues that “Neuro-Archeology” can be 
used to “provide insights that may facilitate the process of compliance and peace 
building” (Woodcock, 2003:112).  “Neuro-Archeology” is defined as the process of 
discovering “artifacts of the activities of the human brain . . . in the writing or other 
activities produced by the individual concerned” and using these artifacts to reconstruct 
the internal dynamics and models that may have been responsible for their creation 
(Woodcock, 2003:112).  Trotsky’s description of the Russian Revolutions of 1917 is then 
used to construct a systems dynamics model of the overthrow of the Tsarist government 
in Russia (2003:128).  Woodcock concludes that such models could help provide 
understanding of how individuals perceive “the complex problems with which they are 
faced”, and that such understanding could support the process of compliance and peace 
building “in an uncertain, complex and dangerous world” (2003:135). 
 Like the process of world development, urban renewal, and revolution in Tsarist 
Russia, a post-conflict reconstruction takes place in a complex evolving social system.  
There are various fields of study from military theory, demographics, economics, 
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political science, and sociology, among others, that make predictions about post-conflict 
reconstructions and their environments.  A post-conflict reconstruction model would have 
to be populated with data from all these fields of study.  A mathematical model capable 
of capturing the dynamics of a post-conflict reconstruction operation should have the 
characteristics of a systems dynamics model.  It should be nonlinear and higher order, 
contain both positive and negative feedback loops, and bring together disparate 
intellectual fields.  Post-conflict reconstruction operations are conducted at the edge of 
anarchy, where the traditional assumptions of economics and political science may not 
apply.   In the past, systems dynamics has been used to successfully model social systems 
that take place at the nexus of economics, political science, and sociology.  If the proper 
relationships are captured, a system dynamics model can be used to simulate a post 
conflict-reconstruction. 
 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction Literature 
 Since World War II the United States has become involved in close to a dozen 
post-conflict reconstruction operations (Dobbins et al., 2003:2)  These operations range 
from the larger projects of postwar Germany, Austria, and Japan to the shorter and more 
limited operations in Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama.  Over the years these operations, 
and others like them, have been studied providing key lessons (Dobbins et al., 2003:2). 
 One of the lessons that has been learned is that security must be established for a 
post-conflict reconstruction operation to be successful.  “Play to Win,” the final report of 
the Bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, concluded that security is 
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essential to post-conflict reconstruction saying that while “every case is different, there is 
one constant—if security needs are not met, both the peace in a given country and the 
intervention intended to promote it are doomed to fail” (p. 4).  In the article “Democracy 
by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building,” von Hippel explains that 
reestablishing security in a country is one of the fundamental elements required in 
rebuilding and democratizing states after an intervention (p 106).  Even if an intervention 
is able to successfully strengthen democratic institutions in a state, these “strengthened 
democratic institutions will not endure unless the state maintains the legal monopoly on 
force” (von Hippel, 2000:106).  
 The term security refers to the need to secure “the lives of citizens from 
immediate and large-scale violence,” the need to secure the lives of “international 
assistors,” and the need to “restore the state’s ability to maintain territorial integrity” 
(Play to Win, 2003:10).  This encompasses “all aspects of public safety, particularly the 
establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate and 
stable security institutions” (Play to Win, 2003:10).  For the purposes of this study, a 
military operation aimed at bringing about this security is a stability operation. 
 Integral to the establishment of a safe and secure environment and to the 
development of legitimate and stable security institutions is the establishment of the rule 
of law.  In 2000, the commander of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia commissioned the 
U.S. Army Peace Keeping Institute to prepare a report on the lessons learned in Bosnia 
on the establishment of the rule of law.  The report concluded that for the rule of law to 
take hold in a post-conflict situation three transitions must take place: the transition “from 
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disorder to order”, the transition “from a hostile to a permissive environment”, and the 
transition “from institutional incapacity to capacity” (Mac Warner, Mike Dziedzic, Tyler 
Randolph, Peter Garcia, Susan Remis Silver, and Sandy Levinson, 2000:xi) . 
 The first transition, “from disorder to order” essentially refers to the cessation of 
large scale hostilities (Warner et al.., 2000:xi).  Few gains can be made in establishing the 
rule of law while widespread combat operations are still taking place.  The task of 
making this transition primarily falls on the shoulders of the military (Warner et al., 
2000:xi). 
 The second transition, “from a hostile to a permissive environment” refers to the 
task of “shaping the environment so that the rule of law can take root” (Warner et al., 
2000:xi) .  This means ensuring that the current power structures in the state are 
conducive to the rule of law.  “Shaping the environment” is achieved through a 
combination of military operations conducted in concert with wider civilian political 
reforms (Warner et al., 2000:xi).  For instance, if organized crime has taken root and is 
asserting a strong influence on political power in a state, dismantling that organized crime 
power structure would be essential to creating an environment in which the rule of law 
can be established (Warner et al.,2000:xi). 
 The third transition, “from institutional incapacity to capacity” refers to the 
development of legitimate and secure security institutions, such as police, courts, prisons, 
border guards, and a civil defense force (Warner et al.,2000:xi).    If the institutional 
capacity to bring criminals to justice while protecting human rights does not exist then 
there can be no sense of personal safety for the population at large (Perito 2003:3).  The 
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development of these security institutions is essential for the protection of the 
fundamental rights that make a free and fair civil society possible.  Without a sense of 
personal safety, refugees and internally displaced persons will not return home, former 
combatants will not lay down their arms and reintegrate into civilian life, farmers and 
merchants will not engage in food production or business activity, and parents will not 
send their children to school or seek economic opportunity (Play to Win, 2000:10). 
 In order to illuminate some of the underlying relationships involved in the 
establishment of security in a post-conflict reconstruction, this research effort drew on 
literature and sources from a wide variety of disciplines.  In addition to the sources 
previously discussed, sources on law enforcement, economics, and the mechanics of 
insurgency and counter-insurgency were consulted. 
 Information on law enforcement and counter-insurgency operations in a post-
conflict environment was drawn from U.S. military doctrine on operations other than war 
and peace operations, Department of Defense Joint Publications 3-07 and 3-07.3 
respectively.  Papers by Neumeyer from the Journal of Peace Research and Morcan and 
Reece from the National Bureau of Economic Research were consulted for information 
on the relationship between crime and the economy. 
 Information on the economics of post-conflict reconstruction was drawn from a 
variety of sources.  The World Bank policy research report entitled Breaking the Conflict 
Trap: Civil War and Development Policy was indispensable as a general reference on 
civil war and its aftermath.  United Nations resolution 53/92 entitled “The Causes of 
Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa” 
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was a useful source on the approach of the United Nations to post-conflict reconstruction.  
Dalgaard and Hansen’s paper “On Aid, Growth and Good Policies” provided insight on 
the influential factors for economic growth in low income and post-conflict countries.  
The 2003 Center for Strategic and International Studies paper by Harme and others on 
post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq was useful as it identified critical infrastructures and 
essential services in post-conflict Iraq.  Blanchard’s book on macroeconomics and 
Okun’s paper on economic growth and unemployment provided insight on the 
relationship between economic growth and unemployment rates. 
 Information on the mechanics of insurgency and counter-insurgency was drawn 
from the concluding report of the Challenges Project and a paper by Epstein and others 
on “Modeling Civil Violence: An Agent-Based Computational Approach.”  The 
Challenges Project was a five year study of multinational peace operation initiated by the 
Swedish National Defense College, and was useful as a source on measures of 
effectiveness in peace operations.  The paper by Epstein and others presented an agent 
based model for civil violence and was indispensable as a source on the mechanics of 
insurgency and counter-insurgency. 
 
Summary 
 Systems dynamics models represent complex social systems as webs of time 
phased interconnected level and rate variables.  This type of model is well suited for 
simulating the complex and interconnected environment in which post-conflict 
reconstructions takes place.  The literature relevant to post-conflict reconstruction was 
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surveyed and the establishment of security is identified as critical to the success of a post-
conflict reconstruction.   
 17
III. Methodology 
 
Selection of Variables 
 In a system dynamics simulation the determination of the model’s structure is 
critical (Forrester, 1969:114).  “The first step in modeling is to generate a model that 
creates the problem” (Forrester, 1969:113).  A model must contain “all the interacting 
relationships necessary to lead the system into trouble” (Forrester, 1969:113).  If such a 
model cannot be created then there is no hope that the system can be restructured to lead 
the system’s internal processes in a different direction (Forrester, 1969:113).  In order to 
simulate the behavior of a complex system, variables must be selected that can represent 
different aspects of the state of the system. 
 This study identified 23 state variables for inclusion in the general case of the 
stability operations model.  These variables were selected with the aim that collectively 
they describe the state of the stability operation adequately enough so that various macro-
level policies can be tested using the simulation.  These variables were also selected so 
that, as much as possible, they represent directly measurable real world phenomena.  The 
23 state variables used in this model fall into six basic categories: (1) the indigenous 
security institutions, (2) law enforcement, (3) the labor market, (4) insurgent activity and 
coalition military activity, (5) critical infrastructures, and (6) public opinion. 
 In a post-conflict reconstruction effort the development of legitimate and stable 
security institutions is critical to the establishment of a safe and secure environment (Play 
to Win, 2003:10).  Creating a secure environment calls for diverse capabilities that 
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include “border patrol; customs support; weapons collection; large-scale (belligerent 
groups) and targeted (indicted persons) apprehension conducted in coordination with 
police” (Play to Win, 2003:10).  Depending on the post-conflict situation, the intervening 
military will likely have to perform these security duties at the outset of a stability 
operation, but as the intervening military forces “adapt their roles and force levels to the 
changing security situation” the indigenous security forces will have to assume increased 
responsibility or a security gap could develop (Play to Win, 2003:10).  This model 
captures the capacity of the indigenous security institutions by tracking their manning 
levels.  The manning levels of the various security institutions are represented with six 
state variables: (1) the number of indigenous border patrol personnel, (2) the number of 
indigenous civil defense personnel, (3) the number of indigenous military personnel, (4) 
the number of indigenous border patrol personnel in training, (5) the number of 
indigenous civil defense personnel in training, and (6) the number of indigenous military 
personnel in training. 
 Law enforcement capabilities are important in post-conflict situations.  “A peace 
operation must clear the way for the rule of law if a durable peace is to emerge from the 
disorder of internal conflict” (Warner et al. 2000:iii).  U.S. Joint Doctrine for Military 
Operations Other than War (MOOTW) says that a foreign internal defense program 
aimed at assisting another nation against subversion and insurgency may need to combat 
threats to host nation security such as civil unrest, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism 
(JP 3-07, 1995:III-10).  These threats and others are often best combated with law 
enforcement personnel and to that end the U.S. has joint doctrine that governs the training 
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of indigenous law enforcement personnel (JP 3-07.3, 1999:III-5).  This model captures 
the indigenous law enforcement capacity through two state variables: (1) the number of 
indigenous police officers and (2) the number of indigenous police officers in training.  
The effectiveness of anti-crime efforts is gauged in this model through the numbers of 
criminals and incarcerated criminals in the country; in this model a criminal is defined as 
anyone who seeks to support themselves through illegal means (i.e. theft, fraud, 
extortion). 
 The labor market is included in the model because getting people back to work 
and establishing some sort of economic normalcy after a conflict is important for creating 
and maintaining post-conflict security.  A report of the UN Secretary-General listed 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of military forces after a conflict 
as one of the priorities of post-conflict peace building (UN, 1998: paragraph 66).  The 
DDR helps reduce the risk of a return to conflict “both through the direct effects of 
decreased military expenditure and manpower and through the indirect effects on growth 
and poverty reduction of budget reallocation and the return of the labor force” (Collier, 
Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, and Sambanis, 2003: 159). 
 There is a fear among policy makers that the demobilization of large numbers of 
soldiers will be disruptive and that demobilized soldiers will turn to violent crime to 
support themselves (Collier et al., 2003:161).  The World Bank suggests that the way to 
mitigate this risk is to provide productive economic opportunities for soldiers who have 
been demobilized (Collier et al., 2003:161).  As a result, it is essential that the provision 
of jobs and other economic opportunities be emphasized to facilitate the DDR of former 
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soldiers and the creation of a stable post-conflict environment.  The state of the labor 
market in this initial model is described by four state variables: (1) unemployed persons 
including discouraged workers, (2) non-military non-police government employees, (3) 
private sector employees, and (4) the country’s per capita gross domestic product. 
 The amount of insurgent activity as well as the amount of coalition military 
activity are important measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for stability operations.  
Examples of MOEs of security in a peace operation include the number of incidents of 
hostile fire per week and the number of patrols per week (Challenges Project, 2002:265).  
In this model insurgent activity and coalition activity are captured by three state 
variables: (1) the number of insurgents in country, (2) the number of detained insurgents, 
and (3) the number of coalition troops in country. 
   “War destroys infrastructure, leaving the population in conditions that increase 
the risk of disease” and other humanitarian crises (Collier et al., 2003:169).  The critical 
infrastructures in this model are infrastructures that are deemed initially essential for 
preventing humanitarian crisis and or social unrest.  Some critical infrastructures are 
country specific, others are universal.  Potable water and food distribution infrastructures 
are universally critical infrastructures.  Shelter, electricity, and fuel among others are 
critical in some settings, while not as critical in other settings.  For example, in Iraq the 
fuel production and distribution infrastructure is deemed critical, as many people rely on 
it for cooking and transportation (Hamre, Barton, Crocker, Mendelson-Forman, and Orr, 
2003:4).  A widespread disruption in the distribution of fuel could lead to increased social 
unrest (Hamre et al., 2003:5).  In the general model proposed here, food, fuel, water, and 
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electricity are included as critical infrastructures.  When the model is applied in a specific 
case it is expected that other critical infrastructures of interest will be identified and 
added.  Critical infrastructure capacity is represented in this model by four state variables: 
(1) the amount of water delivered daily, (2) the amount of food delivered daily, (3) the 
amount of fuel delivered daily, and (4) the amount of electricity delivered daily. 
 The final basic category is the public opinion of the occupation among the 
indigenous population.  In this category public opinion is represented by two state 
variables: (1) the number of people who are dissatisfied with the coalition’s occupation 
and (2) the number of people who are neutral to or satisfied with the coalition’s 
occupation.  These variables are included to act as proxies for the perceived legitimacy of 
the occupation and indigenous government being supported by the occupation.  The 
development of a legitimate indigenous government is essential to the creation of 
sustainable security (Play to Win, 2003:14).  “Ultimately, it is the extent to which a 
coherent, legitimate government exists – or can be created – that determines the success 
or failure of post-conflict reconstruction” (Play to Win, 2003:14). 
Rates of Change 
 The model developed in this study represents a stability operation and its 
environment as a network of interconnected level values and rates of change (see Figure 
3.1).  The level values identify the state of the system while the rates of change describe 
how those level values evolve over time.  The previous section identified a set of 23 state 
variables, or level values, that capture important aspects of the stability operation and its 
environment.  These level values capture the state of the stability operation but by 
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themselves do not develop over time.  Each level value has one or more rates of change 
associated with it.  These rates of change determine how the level values evolve over 
time and together they determine how the entire system evolves over time.  Figure 3.1 
shows the overall structure of the model. 
 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 list each of the level values in this model and their associated 
rates of change.  The direction of change column indicates what effect a positive rate of 
change will have on its associated level value.  A plus sign indicates that a positive rate of 
change will increase the size of the level value, and a negative rate of change will 
decrease the size of the level value.  A minus sign indicates that a positive rate of change 
will decrease the size of the level value, and a negative rate of change will increase the 
size of the level value.   
Table 3.1:  Non-Labor Force Level Values and Associated Rates of Change 
Level Value 
Direction of 
Change Associated Rates of Change 
Per Capita GDP + Per Capita GDP Growth Rate 
+ Coalition Troop Rate of Change 
Coalition Military Forces - Coalition Casualty Rate 
Amount of Water Delivered Daily + Water Infrastructure Development Rate 
Amount of Food Delivered Daily - Food Infrastructure Development Rate 
Amount of Fuel Delivered Daily + Fuel Infrastructure Development Rate 
Amount of Electricity Delivered Daily - Electricity Infrastructure Development Rate 
People Who are Dissatisfied with the 
Occupation - Public Opinion Rate of Change 
People who are Neutral to or Support the 
Occupation + Public Opinion Rate of Change 
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Table 3.2: Labor Force Level Values and Associated Rates of Change 
Level Value Direction of Change Associated Rates of Change 
- Border Patrol Personnel KIA Rate 
- Border Patrol Attrition Rate Indigenous Border Patrol Personnel 
+ Border Patrol Personnel Graduation Rate from Training 
+ Recruitment Rate of Border Patrol Personnel Trainees Indigenous Border Patrol 
Personnel in Training - Border Patrol Personnel Graduation Rate from Training 
- Civil Defense Personnel KIA Rate 
- Civil Defense Attrition Rate Indigenous Civil Defense Service Personnel 
+ Civil Defense Personnel Graduation Rate from Training 
+ Recruitment Rate of Civil Defense Personnel Trainees Indigenous Civil Defense 
Service Personnel in Training - Civil Defense Personnel Graduation Rate from Training 
- Indigenous Military KIA Rate 
- Indigenous Military Attrition Rate Indigenous Military Personnel 
+ Indigenous Military Graduation Rate from Training 
+ Recruitment Rate of Indigenous Military Trainees Indigenous Military Personnel 
in Training - Indigenous Military Graduation Rate from Training 
- Police Officer KIA Rate 
- Police Officer Attrition Rate Indigenous Police Officers 
+ Police Officer Graduation Rate from Training 
+ Recruitment Rate of Police Officer Trainees Indigenous Police Officers in 
Training - Police Officer Graduation Rate from Training 
+ Rate of Criminal Recruitment Criminals 
- Criminal Apprehension Rate 
+ Criminal Apprehension Rate Incarcerated Criminals 
- Incarcerated Criminal Release Rate 
- Recruitment Rate of Border Patrol Personnel Trainees 
- Recruitment Rate of Civil Defense Personnel Trainees 
- Recruitment Rate of Indigenous Military Trainees 
- Recruitment Rate of Police Officer Trainees 
- Rate of Criminal Recruitment 
- Recruitment Rate of Government Employees 
- Private Sector Hiring Rate 
- Insurgent Recruit Rate 
+ Detained Insurgent Release Rate 
Unemployed Persons 
+ Incarcerated Criminal Release Rate 
Government Employees + Recruitment Rate of Government Employees 
Private Sector Employees + Private Sector Hiring Rate 
+ Insurgent Rate of Change Insurgents 
- Insurgent Killed or Capture Rate 
+ Insurgent Capture Rate Detained Insurgents - Detained Insurgent Release Rate 
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Table 3.1 presents the level values and the associated rates of change of public 
opinion, critical infrastructures, coalition military capability, and the per capita GDP.  
Table 3.2 presents each of the level values and the associated rates of change for the total 
labor force of the indigenous population.  Everyone in the indigenous country’s labor 
force is categorized as either unemployed, a criminal, an insurgent, a private employee or 
some form of government employee.  In this model these categories are clearly defined 
and assumed to be mutually exclusive.  Unemployed people are defined as discouraged 
workers and people actively looking for a job.  Criminals are defined as people who do 
not hold a legal job and support themselves through illegal activity.  Insurgents are 
defined as people actively working to thwart the occupation through violence.  Insurgents 
can commit crime, but criminals do not work to thwart the occupation.  As the model 
evolves over time, people move back and forth between the unemployed category and the 
various categories in accordance with the associated rates of change. 
 In an effort to make the model easier to explain and understand, it has been 
divided up into six sub-models.  These six sub-models correspond to the six basic aspects 
of a stability operation identified in the previous section.  These are indigenous security 
institutions, law enforcement, coalition military and insurgent activity, the labor market, 
critical infrastructures, and public opinion.  Figure 3.2 shows a high level representation 
of the general stability operations model in terms of these six sub-models.  The arrows in 
the figure represent the effects each sub-model has on the other sub-models.  Effects may 
be direct or indirect.  As noted by the single and double headed arrows, some interactions 
have been modeled as one way interactions while others have been formulated as two 
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way interactions.  Of course other modules can be added as desired.  In the following six 
sections the rates of change associated with each of the level values in each of these sub-
models are identified and explained. 
Labor 
Market 
Law 
Enforcement
Indigenous 
Security 
Institutions 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
Public 
Opinion
Coalition 
Military and 
Insurgent 
Activities 
 
Figure 3.2:  Sub-model Connections 
 
 Indigenous Security Institutions Sub-model 
 The indigenous security institutions sub model is comprised of three 
organizations: (1) the border patrol, (2) the civil defense force, and (3) the indigenous 
military.  Each of these organizations has a different influence on other level and rate 
values in the model.  The level of border patrol personnel affects the number of 
international insurgents that can slip into the country.  The number of civil defense 
personnel and the number of indigenous military personnel each exert a different 
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influence on the number successful insurgent attacks on the country’s critical 
infrastructure and the rate at which insurgents are captured or killed. 
Figure 3.3 presents the structure of the indigenous security institutions sub-model.  
The state of the indigenous security institutions is represented by six level values; its 
development over time is determined by 12 associated rates of change.  Level values (i.e. 
state variables) are represented as rectangular boxes, flows of people are represented as 
solid arrows, rates of change are represented as arrow boxes (i.e. valves), parametric 
inputs are represented as dashed arrows, and level values that are exogenous to the model 
are represented as clouds. 
Unemployed persons are recruited into the training programs of the three security 
services at the rates determined by equations 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. 
Eq. 3.1 BPRecruitRate(t) ~ BPRRDist ( ))(),( ReRe tt cruitRateBPcruitRateBP σµ    
Eq. 3.2 CDRecruitRate(t) ~ CDRRDist ( ))(),( ReRe tt cruitRateCDcruitRateCD σµ    
Eq. 3.3 IMRecruitRate(t) ~ IMRRDist ( ))(),( ReRe tt cruitRateIMcruitRateIM σµ    
These rates are the daily numbers of unemployed people who join the training programs 
of the border patrol, the civil defense force, and the indigenous military.  As unemployed 
people enter into the training program of each security service they change their 
employment status.  They are re-classified as border patrol trainees, civil defense force 
trainees, and indigenous military trainees respectively.  For example, a border patrol 
recruitment rate of x people per day would increase the border patrol personnel in training 
level by x people per day and decrease the unemployed persons level by x people per day. 
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 Figure 3.3:  Indigenous Security Institutions Sub-model 
 
The recruitment rates of the three security services are determined by factors 
exogenous to the model, such as the wages offered to members of each of the security 
services and the maximum capacities of the training facilities for each of the security 
services.  The distributions of each of these three rates depend on the operational 
situation being modeled.  If known distributions or rates exist, they would, of course, be 
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utilized.  If they do not exist, research could be done to develop distributions or rates (a 
function has also been suggested).  A potential distribution would be the Poisson 
distribution as it is a discrete distribution well suited for modeling an arrival process 
(Kulkarni, 1995:199).  If a Poisson distribution is used, the recruitment rates of the three 
security services would be given by equations 3.1a, 3.2a, and 3.3a. 
Eq. 3.1a BPRecruitRate(t) ~ Poisson( )(tBPRRλ ) 
Eq. 3.2a CDRecruitRate(t) ~ Poisson( )(tCDRRλ ) 
Eq. 3.3a IMRecruitRate(t) ~ Poisson( )(tIMRRλ ) 
 Once trainees have entered the training programs for their security service they 
are batched into classes.  Each class takes a predetermined number of training days 
before it is graduated and enters active duty.  The maximum number and size of the 
training classes, as well as the lengths of the training programs, are determined by factors 
such as the skill requirements of each of the security services, the time it takes for 
trainees to reach the required skill level, the size of the training cadre, and the maximum 
capacities of the training facilities in the theater.  These factors are exogenous to the 
model and would be based on specific operational requirements.  The class size, 
maximum number of classes, and training length are potential policy factors that can be 
tested with this model. 
Not every trainee who enters the training program of one of the security services 
graduates.  A percentage of each of the training classes is assumed to return to 
unemployed status at the end of their training program. (It would be possible to have 
trainees washout throughout the program if such fidelity were desired.  It has not been 
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provided in this model, however.)  This percentage (xxxTrainingAttrition) is the training 
program’s attrition rate. It is represented by a random variable whose functional 
distribution is determined by factors exogenous to the model.  While the functional 
distribution of each training program’s attrition rate must be chosen to reflect the 
specifics of each different scenario being modeled, a possible choice would be a Beta 
distribution as it returns a number between two endpoints and can be parameterized to be 
skewed as the scenario requires.   
 The graduation rates of each of the security services are discrete functions.  For 
the days when there is no class of trainees graduating, the graduation rate for each of the 
security service training programs are zero.  On the days that a class is graduating the 
graduation rate for that security service is the class size multiplied by one minus the 
training program’s attrition rate.  The graduation day for a particular class is the start date 
of that class plus the class length.  The graduation rates for the border patrol, the civil 
defense force, and the indigenous military are given by equations 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 
respectively. 
Eq. 3.4 BPGradRate(t) = 
( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*)( tAttritionBPTrainingtsSizeBPGradClas if
otherwise
eCurrentDatthClasslengtStartDate =+ )(  
Eq. 3.5 CDGradRate(t) =  
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*)( tAttritionCDTrainingtsSizeCDGradClas if
otherwise
eCurrentDatthClasslengtStartDate =+ )(   
Eq. 3.6 IMGradRate(t) = 
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*)( tAttritionIMTrainingtsSizeIMGradClas if
otherwise
eCurrentDatthClasslengtStartDate =+ )(   
 31
A possible expansion to the model would be to allow training programs of different 
lengths and intensities to graduate security personnel with different levels of 
effectiveness.  This would allow policies concerning the trade-offs between the quality 
and quantity of security personnel to be tested, for example. 
  As the trainees of each of the security services graduate and transition to active 
duty status, the number of trainees in the affected security service training program 
decreases accordingly and the number of active duty personnel in the respective security 
service increases accordingly.  The model assumes that the number of active duty 
personnel in each security services can only be increased by the graduation of classes of 
trainees.  The number of active duty security personnel in each of the security services 
decreases as a result of that service’s casualty rate and its active duty attrition rate. 
 The active duty attrition rate of each of the security services represents the rate at 
which active duty security personnel separate from their jobs.  The model then returns 
these individuals to unemployed status where they remain until they enter some other 
employment category.  These separations could be as a result of personnel quitting, being 
fired, or being incapacitated to an extent that they can no longer perform their job.  The 
active duty attrition rate for each of the security services are random variables whose 
functional distributions depend on the particular scenario being simulated, and are 
determined by factors exogenous to the model.  A possible distribution might be a 
discrete uniform distribution, for example.  The active duty attrition rates for the three 
security services are given by equations 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9. 
 Eq. 3.7 BPAttritionRate(t)  ~ BPARDist ( ))(),( tt nRateBPAttritionRateBPAttritio σµ    
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 Eq. 3.8 CDAttritionRate(t) ~ CDARDist ( ))(),( tt nRateCDAttritionRateCDAttritio σµ  
 Eq. 3.9 IMAttritionRate ~ IMARDist ( ))(),( tt nRateIMAttritionRateIMAttritio σµ    
A possible expansion to the model would be to make the attrition rates of the security 
services dynamic by making the attrition rates of the security services functions of the 
casualty rates of each security service, the public opinion, or perhaps other economic 
opportunities. 
The killed in action rate of each of the security services is the rate at which the 
active duty security personnel of each of the services are killed.  The security service 
personnel who are killed leave active duty status and are eliminated from the model, 
instead of returning to unemployed status as happens to the active duty security personnel 
who have been attrited. 
In this “first-cut” model, security forces that are wounded are not modeled, only 
the killed in action rates for each of the security services are modeled.  These killed in 
action rates are functions of the daily number of insurgent attacks, the likelihood that 
casualties occur, and the effectiveness of the security forces.  The killed in action rates 
for the border patrol, civil defense force, and indigenous military are given by equations 
3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 respectively. 
Eq 3.10 BPKIARate(t) =  
BPAttackEffectivenessParameter(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * BPCasualtyRandomVariable(t) 
Eq 3.11 CDKIARate(t) =  
 CDAttackEffectivenessParameter(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * CDCasualtyRandomVariable(t)  
Eq 3.12 IMKIARate(t)  =  
 IMAttackEffectivenessParameter(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * IMCasualtyRandomVariable(t) 
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 Law Enforcement Sub-model 
The law enforcement sub-model simulates the amount of violent crime in a 
country as a function of the number of police officers and criminals in the country.  This 
is done with four level values and seven rates of change.  Figure 3.4 shows the structure 
of the law enforcement sub-model.  Equations 3.20 and 3.21, represented in figure 3.2 as 
ovals, are instantaneously computed functions. 
In the law enforcement sub-model the recruitment, training, and deployment of 
police officers are modeled in the same manner as the security personnel recruitment, 
training, and deployment are modeled in the indigenous security institution sub-model.  
However, the specific parameter values in the various rate functions are different as the 
appropriate parameters for modeling police officer training and deployment are not 
necessarily the same parameters necessary for modeling the training and deployment of 
security services.  The police recruitment rate is the rate at which police officer trainees 
are recruited out of the pool of unemployed people.  This rate is given by equation 3.13. 
Eq. 3.13 PORecruitRate(t) ~ PORRDist ( ))(),( ReRe tt cruitRatePOcruitRatePO σµ    
Once police officer trainees are recruited, they are batched into classes and are trained for 
the amount of time required.  Once a class of police officer trainees has trained for the 
required amount of time, the class is graduated and the police officer trainees in the class 
become active duty police officers.  Like the security forces, not every police officer 
trainee graduates.  It is again assumed that on graduation day a percentage of the 
graduating class is returned to unemployed status according to the training attrition rate.  
This police officer trainee attrition rate is a random variable whose functional distribution 
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is determined by factors exogenous to the model.  It would be fitted or selected according 
to specific situational needs.  The police officer graduation rate (POGradRate) is given 
by equation 3.14. 
Eq. 3.14 POGradRate(t) =  
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*)( tAttritionPOTrainingtsSizePOGradClas if
otherwise
eCurrentDatthClasslengtStartDate =+ )(  
As currently modeled, the number of active duty police officers can only be increased by classes 
of police officer trainees graduating from the police officer training program. 
 
Figure 3.4:  Law Enforcement Sub-model 
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 The number of police officers on active duty is reduced by police officer attrition 
and police officer casualties.  Police officers are lost as a result of officers quitting, being 
fired, or being severely wounded is accounted for by the police officer attrition rate.  This 
rate is a random variable whose functional distribution must be chosen to reflect the 
particular idiosyncrasies of each scenario being simulated.  The police officer attrition 
rate is the rate at which active duty police officers leave active duty police officer status 
and return to unemployed status.  This rate is given by equation 3.15. 
 Eq. 3.15 POAttritionRate(t)  ~ POARDist ( ))(),( tt nRateBPAttritionRateBPAttritio σµ    
 The number of active duty police officers lost due to death is accounted for by the 
police officer killed in action rate.  The police officers who are killed leave active duty 
status and are eliminated from the model.  They do not return to unemployed status as do 
the police officers who are attrited.  The police officer casualty rate is a function of the 
crime rate and the number of insurgent attacks and is given by equation 3.16. 
Eq.  3.16 POKIARate(t) =  
 InsurgentAttackOnPoliceEffectParameter(t) * PoliceKIARandVar(t) * #ofAttacks(t) 
 + PoliceCrimeRateEffectParameter(t) * PoliceKIARandVar(t) * CrimeRate(t) 
In this baseline model each member of the country’s labor force belongs to one of 
a number of different employment categories.  Some of these employment categories 
have been discussed in previous sections, such as the employment categories related to 
the indigenous security forces, and some of these categories will be explained in the 
following sections.  Three of these employment categories are the unemployed persons 
category, the criminals category, and the insurgent category.  The unemployed category 
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will be discussed further in the labor market section, and the insurgent category will be 
further explored in the coalition military and insurgent activities section.  However, for 
the purpose of explaining how the term criminal is defined in this model a few remarks 
are necessary here.  Criminals are defined in the model as anyone who supports 
themselves through violent crime.  Unemployed persons are defined as people who are 
either actively looking for a job or are discouraged workers.  Insurgents are defined as 
anyone working for the violent overthrow of the occupation.  While it is recognized that 
an insurgent may support themselves through a job, for example, at this level of fidelity, 
the model does not consider overlapping groupings.  In this baseline model it is assumed 
employment categories are mutually exclusive and that a person cannot belong to two of 
these categories at once.  People in the unemployed category are assumed to not commit 
crimes, people in the criminal category are assumed to not attack coalition troops, and 
people in the insurgents category both commit crime and attack coalition troops.   
A recent study of cross-national panel data of homicide rates from 117 countries 
in the period 1980-1997 suggests that both economic growth and high income levels 
lower homicide rates (Neumayer, 2003:635).  This is consistent with the rational choice 
theory of crime.  The rational choice theory of crime assumes that an individual “weighs 
the benefits against the costs of committing violent crime and decides to commit the 
crime if the net present value of the benefit exceeds the net present value cost” 
(Neumayer, 2003:623).  According to this rational choice theory of crime, policies that 
raise the costs of committing crime reduce the crime rate (Neumayer, 2003:623).  
Increasing the probability of apprehension for criminals lowers the crime rate by directly 
 37
increasing the costs of committing a crime, while improving the economic prospects of 
individuals lowers the crime rate by increasing the opportunity cost of committing crime. 
This model assumes a rational choice theory of crime.  The number of criminals 
in the country increases when unemployed persons to stop looking for a job and start 
supporting themselves through crime.  The rate at which unemployed people turn to 
crime is the criminal recruitment rate.    A positive criminal recruitment rate is associated 
with an increase in the number of criminals, while a negative criminal recruitment rate is 
associated with criminals choosing to stop supporting themselves through crime and start 
looking for jobs. 
The criminal recruitment rate is a function of the number of unemployed people 
in the country and the criminal apprehension rate.  Representing the criminal recruitment 
rate as a function of the number of unemployed people and the criminal apprehension rate 
is consistent with both empirical evidence and the rational choice theory of crime.   Using 
data from a survey of over 16,000 high school students in the United States a paper 
published in by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that violent crime rates 
are directly correlated with unemployment (Mocan and Rees, 1999:Abstract).  This is 
also consistent with the rational choice theory of crime, as an increase in employment 
options increases the opportunity cost of crime. The criminal recruitment rate used in this 
model is given in equation 3.17. 
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Eq 3.17 CriminalRecruitRate(t) = CriminalRecruitRateInterceptParameter(t) +  
 UnemploymentEffectParameter(t) * UnemploymentLevel(t)  +  
 CriminalApprehensionRateEffectParameter(t) * CriminalApprehensionRate(t) +  
 CriminalRecruitRateDist ( ))(),( ReRe tt cruitRateCcruitRateC σµ  
 The criminal apprehension rate is the daily number of criminals arrested.  It 
represents the rate at which criminals transition from criminal status to incarcerated 
criminal status.  The criminal apprehension rate is a function of the number of criminals 
in the country, the number of coalition military troops working to suppress crime, the 
number of civil defense troops, and the number of active duty indigenous police officers.  
The criminal apprehension rate is given by equation 3.18. 
Eq. 3.18 CriminalApprehensionRate(t) = Criminals *  
(PoliceEffectParameter(t) * PoliceOfficers(t) + CivilDefenseTroopEffectParameter(t) *  
CivilDefenceTroops(t)  + CMilitaryEffectParameter(t) * CMilitaryPolicing(t)) *  
CriminalApprehensionRateRandVar(t) 
Each police officer, civil defense troop, and coalition military troop working at crime 
suppression apprehends a certain number of criminals each day.  This apprehension rate 
is determined in equation 3.18 by the police effectiveness parameter, the civil defense 
troop effectiveness parameter, and the coalition military effectiveness parameter.  These 
effectiveness parameters can be constants to model the effectiveness of police and troops 
as a linear function of their numbers, or the effectiveness parameters can themselves be 
functions of the numbers of police and troops to model non-linearity associated with 
economies and diseconomies of scale with respect to law enforcement manning levels. 
The criminal apprehension rate is also a function of the total number of criminals in the 
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country; the more criminals there are in the country the likelier it is that a given number 
will be apprehend. 
Currently the model assumes that all indigenous police officers are equally 
effective, and that all coalition troops working in police operations are equally effective.  
A possible expansion to the model would be to model the effectiveness of different types 
of troops to be different.  For instance, in such an expansion an infantry unit working in 
police operations would not apprehend as many criminals as a military police unit of the 
same size.  Another possible expansion would be to model translators who might improve 
the effectiveness of coalition military troops working at police operations. 
 Every day a percentage of the incarcerated criminals are released.  These released 
criminals represent criminals who were investigated and released; tried, found not guilty, 
and released; and criminals who were convicted, served their prison sentence, and 
released.  The percentage of incarcerated criminals released each day has been modeled 
as a random variable whose distribution must be selected to fit the particular scenario 
being simulated.  The factors that influence the choice of what distribution to use are 
factors such as the length of typical sentences for various crimes and the percentage of 
trials that lead to convictions.  The incarcerated criminal release rate is given by equation 
3.19. 
 Eq. 3.19   IncarceratedCriminalReleaseRate(t) =  
  IncarceratedCriminal(t) * IncarceratedCriminalsReleaseRandVar(t) 
 In this model the crime rate has been expressed as a function of the number of 
insurgents and criminals in the country.  The model assumes that each criminal and each 
insurgent in the country commits a certain number of crimes a day, and as a result the 
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crime rate is computed based on the number of criminals and insurgents in the country.  
The crime rate is represented by equation 3.20. 
Eq 3.20 CrimeRate(t) = CrimeRateRandVar(t) * (Criminals(t) * CrimesPerCriminal(t) +  
 Insurgents(t) * CrimesPerInsurgent(t)) 
The crime rate random variable introduces variability into the crime rate to account for 
random influences on the crime rate that are not explicitly included in the model.  The 
choice of the distribution for the crime rate random variable is situation dependent. 
The number of coalition troops conducting crime suppression operations is given 
by equation 3.21.  The allocation of coalition troops between border patrol activities, 
crime suppression operations, and counter insurgency operations is directly impacted by 
the modeler. 
Eq. 3.21 CoaltionTroopsPolicing(t) = TotalCoaltionTroops(t) * %CoalitionPolicing(t) 
 Insurgent and Coalition Military Activities Sub-model 
 The insurgent and coalition military activities sub-model is comprised of three level 
values and six rates of change.  The level values are the number of coalition troops in the 
country, the number of insurgents in the country, and the number of insurgents being 
detained by the coalition.  Figure 3.5 illustrates the nexus of these levels and rates.   The 
coalition troop level is influenced by two rates of change: (1) the coalition troop casualty 
rate and (2) the coalition troops in country rate of change.  The coalition troop rate of 
change represents the net rate at which coalition troops are arriving or departing the country.  
The modeler sets this rate and can set it at different levels to test the effect of various  
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Figure 3.5:  Insurgent and Coalition Military Activities Sub-model 
buildup and drawdown policies.  Equation 3.22 gives the coalition troops in country rate of 
change if the modeler wants to maintain constant a troop level throughout the simulation. 
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Formulating the coalition troops in country rate of change in this manner and holding the 
troop level constant means that the number of troops in country is only increased in order 
to compensate for casualties.  The coalition troops in country rate could just as easily be 
set to some other approximate rate by the modeler to represent a specific situation or 
policy. 
 The coalition troop casualty rate is the rate at which coalition troops are killed or 
wounded to the extent that they cannot function as effective troops.  The coalition troop 
casualty rate is a function of the number of daily insurgent attacks, the likelihood of 
casualties, and the effectiveness of the troops.  The coalition troop casualty rate is given 
by equation 3.23. 
 Eq. 3.23 CoalitionTroopCasualtyRate(t) =  
  InsurgentAttackOnCoalitionEffectParameter(t) * #ofAttacks(t) * CTCasualtyRandVar(t) 
The coalition troops in country level value is decreased by the number of troops that have 
been killed or wounded.  Troops that are killed or wounded leave the model and are no 
longer available for operations. To maintain a specified level of effectiveness the troops 
would have to be replaced. 
 The allocation of the coalition troops in country between the different types of 
activities is a model parameter.  Troops can be allocated into three different activities: 
crime suppression operations, border patrol operations, and counter insurgency 
operations.  This troop allocation is represented by three functions that are 
instantaneously computed based on the troops in country level value and the allocation 
ratios set by the modeler.  Troop allocation between crime suppression operations, border 
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patrol operations, and counter insurgency operations are given by equations 3.21, 3.24, 
and 3.25 respectivly.  The three parameters %CoalitionPolicing,  
%CoalitionPatrollingBorders, and %CounterInsurgency must always sum to one.  
(Equation 3.21 was discussed in the previous section and is included here for 
completeness.) 
 Eq. 3.21 #CoaltionPolicing(t) = TotalCoaltionTroops(t) * %CoalitionPolicing(t) 
 Eq. 3.24 #CoalitionPatrolingBorders(t) =  
TotalCoaltionTroops(t) * %CoalitionPatrollingBorders(t) 
 Eq. 3.25 #CoalitionCounterInsurgency(t) =  
  TotalCoalitionTroops(t) * %CounterInsurgency(t) 
As currently configured this model assumes that every coalition troop is equally effective 
at each activity.  This is not the case in the real world.  A possible expansion to the model 
would be to allow troops to be retrained over a period of time to increase their 
effectiveness at different activities.  For instance, an infantry unit could spend six weeks 
training in crime suppression activities to improve its effectiveness at crime suppression. 
 In this model an insurgent is defined as anyone who is actively working to thwart 
the coalition through violence.  This model assumes the insurgents attempt to thwart the 
coalition by attacking coalition targets and targets viewed as sympathetic to the coalition.  
In this model these are assumed to be coalition troops, indigenous security forces, 
indigenous police, the civilian population, and critical infrastructure.  Insurgents actively 
working to thwart the coalition may also commit non-insurgency related crime, such as 
running a protection racket or a car theft ring.  As a result the number of insurgents in the 
country affects the crime rate.  However, people defined as criminals in this model do not 
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engage in anti-coalition violence per se, and the number of criminals in the country has 
no influence on the number of insurgent attacks. 
 In a working paper for the Center on Social and Economic Dynamics in 2001, 
Epstein, Steinbruner, and Parker present an agent based approach to modeling civil 
violence based on rational choice.  In their model each member of the general population 
can either be “rebellious” or “quiescent” (Epstein et al., 2001:2).  The decision to rebel 
(or not) for each member of the population is made based on which action will maximize 
their expected utility (Epstein et al., 2001:5).  Each person’s expected utility for revolting 
is dependent on their risk tolerance, their level of grievance against the government, and 
their assessment of the probability of being arrested (Epstein et al., 2001:3-5).  Each 
person’s expected utility for not revolting is set at an arbitrary level T (Epstein et al., 
2001:6).  If a person’s expected utility for revolting exceeds their expected utility for not 
revolting they will join the rebellion; if a person’s expected utility for not revolting 
exceeds their expected utility from revolting they become quiescent (Epstein et al., 
2001:5).   
The model presented in this thesis uses a similar approach to simulating 
insurgency.  It is assumed that based on a utility maximization calculation people make a 
rational choice between joining the insurgency and being unemployed.  The rate at which 
people transition from unemployed status to insurgent status is the insurgent rate of 
change, which is a function of the rate at which insurgents are being killed or captured 
and the number of people who are dissatisfied with the occupation.  The insurgent rate of 
change is given by equation 3.26. 
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Eq. 3.26 InsurgentRateOfChange(t) =DissatisfiedPeople(t) *  
 InsurgentKilledorDetainedEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) *  
 InsurgentRateOfChangeRandVar(t) 
The InsurgentKilledorDetainedEffectParameter and the distribution of the 
InsurgentRateOfChangeRandVar depend on the specifics of the scenario being modeled, 
and have to be set according to each individual situation.  They could, however, be 
parameters which vary according to other effects in an expression of the model. 
 In addition to the domestic insurgents who join the insurgency from the ranks of 
the unemployed, international sympathizers can travel to the country and join the 
insurgency.  Of the total number of insurgents that try to enter the country, some 
percentage is turned back by the indigenous border guards and the coalition troops who 
are patrolling the borders.  The rate at which international insurgents enter the country is 
give by equation 3.27. 
 Eq. 3.27 InternationalInsurgentRate(t) = TotalInternationalInsurgentsRandVar(t) *  
  (BorderPatrolEffectParameter(t) * BorderPatrolTroops(t) +  
  CoalitionPatrollingBorderEffectParameter(t) * CoalitionPatrollingBorder(t))  
The total number of international insurgents is a random variable whose distribution 
depends on factors specific to the modeled environment, such as the international 
perception of the legitimacy of the occupation, and the international perception of the 
legitimacy of the insurgency.  While the specifics of each situation dictate the appropriate 
distribution for this random variable, a Poisson distribution would be a possible choice as 
the number of international insurgents trying to enter the country is an arrival rate.   
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The insurgent killed or detained rate is the rate at which insurgents are either 
killed or detained.  The level value for insurgents is decreased every day by this rate.  Of 
the total daily number of insurgents apprehended some percentage are killed in the course 
of their apprehension and the rest are detained.  The percentage of insurgents that are 
killed is a random variable whose distribution depends on the specifics of the individual 
scenario being modeled.  The insurgents that are killed in the course of their 
apprehension are eliminated from the model.  The insurgents that are detained transition 
to the detained insurgents category. 
The rate at which insurgents are apprehended is a function of the total number of 
insurgents, the number of coalition military troops conducting counter insurgency 
operations, the size of indigenous military, the size of the civil defense force, the number 
of tips the coalition receives on insurgent activity.  The insurgent killed or detained rate is 
given by equation 3.28, this rate is subtracted from the insurgents level value.  The 
insurgent detention rate, the rate that is added to the detained insurgents level value is 
given by equation 3.28a.  
Eq. 3.28 InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) =  
 Insurgents(t) * (CTroopsCounterInsurgEffectParameter(t) * CTroopsInCounterInsurg(t) 
 + IMEffectParameter(t) * IndigenousMilitaryTroops(t)  + CDEffectParameter(t) *  
CivilDefenseTroops(t)) * TipsOnInsurgency(t) * InsurgentAppRandVar(t) 
Eq. 3.28a InsurgentDetentionRate(t) = 
 (1-InsurgentKilledRate(t)) * InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) 
Every day a percentage of the detained insurgents are released.  This represents 
the fact that some insurgents that have been apprehended and detained are determined to 
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no longer be a threat and are released.  This percentage is a random number whose 
distribution depends on factors exogenous to the model such as the standard of proof 
coalition forces use when deciding who should and should not be detained.  When 
formerly detained insurgents are released, they return to unemployed status from which 
they may or may not rejoin the insurgency or the workforce.  The insurgent release rate is 
given by equation 3.29. 
Eq. 3.29 InsurgentReleaseRate(t) = DetainedInsurgents(t) * InsurgentReleaseRandVar(t) 
 The amount of insurgent activity is represented in this model by the number of 
attacks the insurgents make on coalition targets and targets perceived by the insurgency 
as sympathetic to the coalition.  The number of insurgent attacks is a direct function of 
the number of insurgents in the country, the likelihood of attack, and their effectiveness 
rate.  The number of insurgent attacks is given by equation 3.30. 
Eq. 3.30 #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) =  
Insurgents(t) * InsurgentEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentAttackRandVar(t) 
The insurgent effectiveness parameter is the average number of attacks each insurgent is 
able to make each day.  The insurgent attack is a random variable that introduces 
variability into the number of attacks each insurgent can make per day.  The distribution 
of the insurgent attack random variable must be chosen by the modeler to fit the 
particular scenario being modeled. 
 A percentage of the total number of insurgent attacks is attacks on critical 
infrastructure targets.  The number of insurgent attacks on critical infrastructure targets is 
a function of the size of civil defense force, the total number of insurgent attacks, and the 
percentage of the total number of attacks that are attacks on critical infrastructure targets.  
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This percentage is a random variable whose distribution is determined by factors 
exogenous to the model, such as the strategy of the insurgency.  The number of insurgent 
attacks on infrastructure is given by equation 3.31. 
 
Eq. 3.31 #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) =  #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * CDEffectParameter(t) * 
CivilDefenseTroops(t) *  %OfAttacksOnInfrastructure(t) 
 Labor Market Sub-model 
 In this baseline model every member of the country’s labor force belongs to one of 
eight groups.  Each person is either unemployed; employed in the private sector; employed 
as a trainee or active duty member of the police, the border patrol, the civil defense force, 
or the indigenous military; employed in a non-security related government job; a criminal; 
or an insurgent.  For simplicity in the model, it has been assumed that each person in the 
labor market belongs to one and only one of these categories.  As the model evolves over 
time, people move from one category to another as prescribed by the various rates of 
change. 
 The previous explanation of the indigenous security institutions sub-model detailed 
how people move back and forth between unemployed status and trainee and active duty 
status in the border patrol, the civil defense force, and the indigenous military.  The 
discussion of the law enforcement sub-model explained how people transition between 
unemployed status and criminal status, as well as police officer trainee status and active 
duty police officer status.  The presentation of the coalition military and insurgent activities 
sub-model explained how people transition between unemployed status and insurgent 
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status.  The only aspects of the labor market that have not yet been discussed are the effects 
of non-security related government jobs, private sector jobs, and the per capita gross 
domestic product.  Figure 3.6 shows the structure of the labor market sub-model. 
 Figure 3.6:  Labor Market Sub-model 
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 The model provides that besides getting a job in the government as a police 
officer, a member of the border patrol, the civil defense force, or the indigenous military, 
people can be employed in non-security related government jobs.  The rate at which 
people transition from unemployed status to government employee status is the 
government employee hire rate.  The upper bound of the government employee hire rate 
is parameter controlled by the modeler, as in an occupation the occupying authority has 
direct control over how many government employees it hires.  At the level of fidelity of 
the baseline model non-security related government employee attrition is not modeled.  
Of course, this could be added if it is of interest in the operational environment being 
modeled.  The government employee hire rate is given by equation 3.32. 
 Eq. 3.32 GovernmentHireRate(t) ~ GHRDist ( ))(),( tt teGovtHireRateGovtHireRa σµ    
The distribution of the government employee hire rate depends on the situation being 
modeled.  A potential distribution would be the Poisson distribution as it is a discrete 
distribution well suited for modeling an arrival process.  If a Poisson distribution is used 
the government employee hire rate would be given by equation 3.32a.   
Eq. 3.32a   GovernmentHireRate ~ Poisson( )(tteGovtHireRaλ ) 
If required, a training delay similar to that seen for the security forces could be 
incorporated into the hiring of non-security government employees. 
 The private sector hire rate represents the rate at which people transition between 
unemployed status and private sector employee status.  Private sector employees are 
defined in this model as anyone employed by the private sector.  This includes people 
employed by a company that has been hired by the government to fulfill a contract, but 
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does not include anyone employed directly by the government.  This rate can be positive 
or negative to represent an increase or decrease in the number of private sector jobs. 
This initial model assumes the private sector hire rate is a function of the growth 
rate of the country’s per capita gross domestic product.  The relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the growth rate of a country’s gross domestic product has been 
well documented and is often referred to as the statistical relationship known as  “Okun’s 
Law” after the economist Arthur Okun who postulated the relationship in 1962 
(Blanchard, 2000:25).  In the paper “Potential GNP: Its Measurement and Significance” 
Okun found that: 
in the postwar period, on the average, each percentage point in the unemployment 
rate above four percent has been associated with about a three percent decrement 
in the real gross national product (1962:2). 
 
Okun supported these findings with a regression of the unemployment rate data onto 
postwar real GNP data (Okun, 1962:2). 
The private sector hire rate is given by equation 3.33.  This equation presents the 
private sector hire rate as a function of the growth rate of the real per capita gross 
domestic product, the real per capita GDP effect parameter, and the private sector hire 
rate random variable. 
Eq. 3.33 PrivateSectorHireRate(t) = RPerCapGDPGrowth(t) * RPerCapGDPEffectParameter(t)  
 * PrivateSectorHireRateRandVar(t) 
The private sector hire rate random variable introduces variability into the relationship as 
the real per capita GDP effect parameter is not known with certainty and fluctuates with 
changes to the overall economy.   The distribution of the private sector hire rate random 
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variable is scenario dependent and must be chosen on the particulars of the economy 
being modeled. 
 In their paper “On Aid, Growth and Good Policies” Carl-Johan Dalgaard and 
Henrik Hansen build an econometric model of economic growth in developing countries.  
In their model they represent real per capita GDP growth as a function of six factors: (1) 
the country’s previous GDP, (2) the amount of civil unrest in the country, (3) the degree 
to which the country is ethnically fractionalized, (4) the quality of the countries 
institutions, the level of development of their financial markets, (5) the quality of the 
country’s economic policy, and (6) the amount of international aid the country has 
received (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2002:35).  In the model developed in this thesis the 
country’s real per capita GDP growth rate is represented as a function of civil unrest, 
captured through the number of insurgent attacks and the crime rate, and the critical 
infrastructure levels.  In this first cut model, the amount of ethnic fractionalization, the 
quality of institutions, financial market development, economic policy, and international 
aid are all assumed to be constant throughout the course of the simulation, and as a result 
are not modeled dynamically.  The real per capita GDP growth rate is given by equation 
3.34. 
 Eq. 3.34 PerCapRGDPGrowthRate(t) = RGDPRandVar(t) * (InsurgentAttacksEffectParameter(t)  
  * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t)  + CrimeEffectParameter(t) * CrimeRate(t)  +  
WaterEffectParameter(t) * WaterShortage(t)  + FoodEffectParameter(t) *  
FoodShortage(t)  + FuelEffectParameter(t)* FuelShortage(t)  +  
ElectricityEffectParameter(t) * ElectricityShortage(t) +  
PreviousPerCapRGDPEffectParameter(t) *  PreviousPerCapRGDP(t))  
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In this equation the distribution of the real per capita GDP growth rate random variable is 
determined by the particulars of the country being modeled and it is influenced by the 
factors of ethnic fractionalization, quality of institutions, financial market development, 
economic policy, and international aid.  Again, greater fidelity can be added if desired in 
specific applications. 
 Critical Infrastructure Sub-model 
 Critical infrastructures are important.  They affect local population’s opinion of 
the occupation, and the growth rate of the economy.  Which infrastructures are critical 
depends on the exact scenario being modeled.  In order to model a particular situation 
more or less critical infrastructures may need to be added or deleted from the general 
model presented here. 
In the generic model developed in this thesis four infrastructures are included in 
the critical infrastructure sub-model: (1) potable water, (2) food, (3) fuel, and (4) 
electricity.  The critical infrastructures were selected based on the assumption that in 
general they are essential for preventing humanitarian crisis or social unrest within the 
population.  The level value of each of these infrastructures is measured in units delivered.  
It is this quantity of the critical resource ultimately delivered as compared to the quantity 
demanded that is assumed to be important in this model.  No distinction is made in this 
baseline model between a shortage of a critical resource due to insufficient production or 
insufficient distribution.  For instance, no distinction is made between a shortage of 
potable water do to an insufficient water treatment infrastructure or a shortage of potable 
water do to an insufficient water distribution infrastructure.  In both cases the critical 
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resource is ultimately not delivered and the effects on public opinion and economic 
activity are the same.   
 The model assumes the demands for the critical resources are exogenous and set 
by the modeler to levels appropriate for modeling the scenario in question.  The critical 
resource shortage/surplus amounts are functions of the quantity delivered of the critical 
resource and the quantity demanded.  The shortage/surplus amounts for water, food, fuel, 
and electricity are given by equations 3.35, 3.36, 3.37, and 3.38 respectively. 
 Eq. 3.35 WaterShortage/Surplus(t) = 
 GallonsOfWaterDelivered(t)  – GallonsOfWaterDemanded(t) 
 Eq. 3.36 FoodShortage/Surplus(t) =  
TonsOfFoodDelivered(t)  - TonsOfFoodDemanded(t) 
 Eq. 3.37 FuelShortage/Surplus(t)  =  
  GallonsOfFuelDelivered(t)  - GallonsOfFuelDemanded(t) 
 Eq 3.38 ElectricityShortage/Surplus(t)  =  
  MegaWattDelivered(t)  – MegaWattDemanded(t) 
A possible expansion to the model would be to make the demand for resources a function 
of the per capita GDP so that as the economy grows and the standard of living rises 
demand for resources such as electricity and fuel also grow.  Another possible expansion 
would be to include the transportation infrastructure and communications infrastructure 
among the critical infrastructures.  These were not included in this version of the model 
as they are not as critical for preventing humanitarian crises as water, food, fuel, and 
electricity.  However, they are important for generating sustained economic growth, and 
should be included in a more comprehensive model. 
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 The development rates for the four critical infrastructures are modeled as 
functions of the baseline development rate, the number of insurgent infrastructure attacks, 
and the levels of other relevant critical infrastructures.  The baseline development rate is 
an input.  It represents an assumed potential development rate under peaceful conditions.  
The number of insurgent infrastructure attacks represents the daily number of insurgent 
attacks on the critical infrastructure and has been discussed in greater detail in the 
explanation of the insurgent and coalition military actions sub-model.  The development 
rates of each of the critical infrastructures are also influenced by the levels of some of the 
other related critical infrastructures.  These interrelations are dependent on the exact 
scenario being modeled, and have to be tailored to fit the particular country of interest.  
For the purpose of explaining the general model some potential relationships are 
identified.   
 The water development rate is the rate of change of the gallons of water 
distributed daily.  It is a function of the baseline water development rate, the number of 
insurgent infrastructure attacks, and the electricity shortage/surplus level as water pumps 
and purification facilities often need electricity to function.  The water development rate 
is given by Equation 3.39. 
 Eq. 3.39 WaterDevelopmentRate(t)  = BaseWaterDevelopmentRate(t) *  
  (InfrastructureAttackWaterEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) +  
  ElectricShortageEffectParameter(t) * ElectricShortage(t)) 
 The food development rate is the rate of change of the tons of food delivered daily.  
It is a function of the baseline food development rate, the number of insurgent 
infrastructure attacks, and the fuel shortage/surplus level.  The food development rate is a 
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function of the fuel shortage/surplus level because the food distribution networks in many 
countries rely of fuel powered truck transportation and a significant shortage of fuel 
could negatively impact the food delivery infrastructure.  The food development rate is 
given by equation 3.40. 
 Eq. 3.40 FoodDevelopmentRate(t) = BaseFoodDevelopmentRate(t) *  
  (InfrastructureAttackFoodEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) +  
  FuelShortageEffectParameter(t) * FuelShortage(t)) 
 The fuel development rate is the rate of change of the gallons of fuel delivered 
daily.  It is a function of the baseline fuel development rate, the number of insurgent 
infrastructure attacks, and the electric shortage/surplus, as oil refineries and fuel 
distribution infrastructures often cannot function at full capacity without electricity.  The 
fuel development rate is given by equation 3.41. 
 Eq. 3.41 FuelDevelopmentRate(t)  = BaseFuelDevelopmentRate(t) *  
  (InfrastructureAttackFuelEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) +  
  ElectricShortageEffectParameter(t) * ElectricShortage(t)) 
 The electric development rate is the rate of change of the number of mega watt 
hours delivered daily.  It is a function of the baseline electric development rate and the 
number of insurgent infrastructure attacks.  The electric development rate is given by 
equation 3.42. 
 Eq. 3.42 ElectricDevelopmentRate = BaseElectricDevelopmentRate(t) *  
  InfrastructureAttackElectricEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t)  
The overall structure of the critical infrastructure sub-model is given in figure 3.7.  
Clearly, other key infrastructures could be modeled, such as fire protection, education, 
and health services, for example.  While they have not been included in the initial model, 
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they could be incorporated into the model as required by the situation being investigated 
and the fidelity needed to meet the analysis requirements. 
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 Public Opinion Sub-model 
 The public opinion sub-model influences the rest of the model in two ways.  The 
number of people who are dissatisfied with the occupation influences the insurgent rate 
of change, and the number of people who are neutral to or satisfied with the occupation 
influences the number of tips the indigenous population gives on insurgent activities.  
Figure 3.8 gives the overall structure of the public opinion sub-model. 
 
Figure 3.8:  Public Opinion Sub-model 
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the shortage/surpluses of the critical resources of (4) water, (5) food, (6) fuel, and (7) 
electricity.  The Public opinion rate of change is given by equation 3.43. 
Eq. 3.43 PublicOpinionRateOfChange(t)  = UnemploymentEffectParameter(t)*  
 UnemploymentLevel(t) + InsurgentAttacksEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentAttacks(t) +  
 CrimeRateEffectParameter(t) * CrimeRate(t) +  
 WaterShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * WaterShortage/Surplus(t)  +  
 FoodShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * FoodShortage/Surplus(t) +  
 FuelShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * FuelShortage/Surplus(t)  +  
 ElectricShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * ElectricShortage/Surplus(t) 
 The number of tips on insurgent activity is the daily number of useful tips the 
coalition receives on insurgent activity.  This number is a function of the number of 
people who are neutral to or satisfied with the occupation.  The more tips the coalition 
troops receive on insurgent activity the more effective they are at apprehending members 
of the insurgency.  The number of tips on insurgent activity is given by equation 3.44. 
 Eq. 3.44 TipsOnInsurgents(t)  = #OfPeopleSatisfiedWithOccupation(t) * TipsRandomVariable(t) 
The tips random variable is a number between zero and one that represents how many 
tips each satisfied or neutral person makes on insurgent activity each day.  The 
distribution of this random variable depends on the specifics of the scenario being 
modeled and an appropriate distribution must be chosen to fit the situation of interest.  An 
obvious extension would be the inclusion of a local and international media effect and 
coalition psychological operations, for example.  Each of these effects is an area for 
further research. 
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Summary 
 The general form of the proposed systems dynamics based model for simulating 
the establishment of security in a post conflict reconstruction is proposed.  The model is 
divided into six sub-models: indigenous security forces, law enforcement, insurgent and 
coalition military activity, labor market, critical infrastructures, and public opinion.  The 
interactions and time dependent functional forms of the rates of change associated with 
each of the 23 level variables in the general model are identified. 
While any number of different variables and levels of fidelity could be added to 
this initial model, it should be recalled that the goal of the thesis is to show the viability 
of this approach.  The base model is populated with scenario specific data and analyzed 
in chapter four as a demonstration of the viability of this approach. 
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IV. Illustration 
 
Notional Scenario: Regime Change 
 Chapter III discussed a general form of the post-conflict stability operations 
model developed in this work.  This chapter demonstrates how the general model can be 
applied to investigate a specific scenario.  This is done by first sketching a notional 
example of a post-conflict stability operation.  The general form of the post-conflict 
stability operations model was then applied to model this notional scenario, and the 
results of the simulation are presented and analyzed. 
 This notional regime change scenario, based on the 2003 overthrow of the 
Baathist regime in Iraq, investigates key factors to the establishment of stability.  In this 
notional scenario, a coalition, including the United States, has determined that the 
government of Iraq posed a threat to security in the world, and that a regime change in 
Iraq was of vital interest.  As a result of this vital interest, an international coalition force 
was formed to enforce a regime change in Iraq.  After a rapid air campaign and land 
invasion, the Iraqi government collapsed. 
Day zero for this notional analysis is assumed to be the day the coalition forces 
captured Baghdad.  The objective of the analysis was to identify influential factors that 
can be used to investigate policy alternatives with respect to the length of time required to 
establish security in the aftermath of the Baathist regime collapse.  This was 
accomplished through first initializing the parameters of the basic stability operations 
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model described in Chapter III, inputting appropriate distributions and parameters, and 
then performing a screening experiment that identifies influential factors.  
Variables 
 As in the general post-conflict stability operations model, the variables are used to 
measure the state of the stability operation in six critical areas: (1) Iraqi security 
institutions, (2) law enforcement, (3) the Iraqi labor market, (4) insurgent and coalition 
military activity, (5) critical infrastructures, and (6) Iraqi public opinion.  These variables 
are summarized in table 4.1. 
Table 4.1:  Summary of Variables in the Notional Regime Change Scenario  
Sub-model State Variable 
# of Iraqi Border Police 
# of Iraqi Civil Defense Personnel 
# of Iraqi Military Personnel 
# of Facility Protection Service Personnel 
# of Iraqi Border Police in Training 
# of Iraqi Civil Defense Personnel in Training 
# of Iraqi Military Personnel in Training 
Iraqi Security Forces 
# of Facility Protection Service Personnel in Training 
# of Iraqi Police Officers 
# of Iraqi Police Officers in Training 
# of Coalition Troops Working in Law Enforcement 
# of Criminals in Iraq 
Law Enforcement 
# of Incarcerated Criminals in Iraq 
# of Unemployed Iraqis 
# of Non-Security Related Government Employees 
# of Private Sector Employees Iraqi Labor Market 
Iraq's Per Capita Gross Domestic Product 
# of Insurgents 
# of Detained Insurgents 
Total Number of Coalition Troops in Iraq 
# of Coalition Troops Securing Iraq's Borders 
Insurgent and Coalition 
Military Activities 
# of Coalition Troops Conducting Counter Insurgency Operations 
Daily Gallons of Potable Water Distributed 
Daily number of Megawatts of Electricity Delivered Critical Infrastructures 
Barrels of Oil Produced Per Day 
Iraqis Dissatisfied With the Coalition Iraqi Public Opinion Iraqis Neutral to or Satisfied With the Coalition 
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 The capacity of the Iraqi security institutions are measured by eight variables: (1) 
the number of Iraqi border patrol personnel, (2) the number of Iraqi civil defense force 
personnel, (3) the number of Iraqi military personnel, (4) the number of facility 
protection service personnel, (5) the number of Iraqi border patrol personnel in training, 
(6) the number of Iraqi civil defense personnel in training, (7) the number of Iraqi 
military personnel in training, and (8) the number of facility protection service personnel 
in training. 
 The state of law enforcement in Iraq is measured by five variables: (1) the number 
of Iraqi police officers, (2) the number of Iraqi police officers in training, (3) the number 
of coalition troops working in a law enforcement capacity, (4) the number of criminals in 
Iraq, and (5) the number of incarcerated criminals in Iraq. 
 The state of the Iraqi labor market is measured by four variables: (1) unemployed 
Iraqis, (2) non-military non-police government employees, (3) private sector employees, 
and (4) Iraq’s per capita gross domestic product. 
 Insurgent activity in Iraq is measured by two variables: (1) the number of 
insurgents in Iraq and (2) the number of detained insurgents.  Regardless of their 
motivation, anyone in Iraq working to thwart the coalition through violent means is 
considered an insurgent.  Coalition troop activity is measured by three variables: (1) the 
total number of coalition troops in Iraq, (2) the number of coalition troops patrolling 
Iraq’s borders, and (3) the number of coalition troops conducting counter-insurgency 
operations. 
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 Iraq’s critical infrastructures included in this scenario are water distribution, 
electricity, and fuel production and distribution.  While there are other important 
infrastructures in Iraq, Pollack suggests these three are critical (Pollak, 2004:2).  Iraq’s 
critical infrastructure will be measured by three variables: (1) the daily gallons of potable 
water distributed, (2) the daily number of megawatt hours of electricity being delivered in 
Iraq, and (3) the number of barrels of crude oil per day produced in Iraq. 
 Public opinion in Iraq is measured by two variables: (1) the number of Iraqis 
dissatisfied with the coalition’s occupation and (2) the number of Iraqis neutral to or 
satisfied with the coalition’s occupation. 
The Rates of Change 
Taken together the 27 level values identified in the preceding section describe the 
state of the stability operation and its environment.  However, by themselves these level 
values do not develop dynamically.  Each level value has one or more rates of change 
associated with it.  These rates of change determine how the level values evolve over 
time.  The level values, coupled with the rates of change, capture how the entire system 
evolves through time.  The overall model of the stability operation in Iraq is divided into 
the six sub-models in the general model: (1) Iraqi security institutions, (2) law 
enforcement, (3) the Iraqi labor market, (4) insurgent and coalition military activity, (5) 
critical infrastructures, and (6) Iraqi public opinion.  The specific equations that 
determine the rates of change in these six sub-models are explained in the following 
sections. 
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 Iraqi Security Institutions 
 In post-conflict Iraq the coalition has worked to increase the capacity of the Iraqi 
security institutions (Swannack,2003:3).  It has done this through the standing up of four 
security services: (1) the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, (2) the Facility Protection Service, 
(3) the Iraqi Border Police, and (4) the Iraqi Army. 
The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) soldiers are Iraqis who are integrated into 
coalition military units “to gather intelligence, run combat patrols in the city, establish 
fixed-site security positions, and conduct raids and cordon search operations” (Miles, 
2003:1).  Recruits for the ICDC enter an intensive three week combat training program 
where they learn troop-leading procedures, crowd and riot control, and how to operate an 
AK-47 assault rifle (Miles, 2003:2).  As of the end of January 2004 the ICDC had 19,800 
troops, with an eventual goal of 40,000 troops (Brookings Institution, 2004:11). 
In this model the training capacity for the ICDC is assumed to be a maximum of 
three classes of 1,000 trainees each.  This training rate is consistent with standing up 
20,000 troops in six months, with a three week training program, and a 25% attrition rate.  
The daily recruiting rate for the ICDC is about 143 troops for a weekly rate of 1000.  The 
Daily recruit rate for the ICDC is given by equation 4.1a and 4.1b.  In this notional 
example the ICDCRecruitRate is a function of time, the ICDC class size, the number of 
classes that can be trained concurrently, and the class length. 
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Eq. 4.1a ICDCRecruitRate(t) = 
(ICDCClassSize(t) * #OfICDCClasses(t)) /ClassLength(t) 
where ICDCClassSize(t) is computed based on the end goal of 20000 in six months for 
this example such that 
(ICDCClassSize(t) * #OfICDCClasses(t)) /ClassLength(t)*(#Days / Week) 
* #Weeks * (1-E(ICDCTrainingAttrition(t))) = #OfDesired ICDC Personnel 
((ICDCClassSize(t) * 3) / 21)*(7 / Week)* 26 * (0.75) = 20000 
ICDCClassSize(t) ≈ 1000 
Eq. 4.1b ICDCRecruitRate(t) = (1000 * 3) / 21 = 143  
The attrition rate for the ICDC training program is assumed to be similar to the 
attrition rate for the Iraqi Army training program and is given by the variable 
ICDCTrainingAttrition which is assumed to be a triangularly distributed random variable 
with a minimum of 0, a mean of 0.25, and a maximum of 0.5.  The attrition rate of the 
Iraqi Army training program and the selection of this distribution is discussed later in this 
section.  The ICDC trainees who do not graduate the program return to unemployed 
status at the end of the training program.  The generic graduation rate for the ICDC is 
given by equation 4.2a while the expression used in the scenario is given by 4.2b.  The 
ICDC training graduation rate is a function of the time period, the ICDCTrainingAttrition, 
and the training class length. 
Eq. 4.2a ICDCGraduationRate(t) = 
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*)( tnngAttritioICDCTrainitClassSize if
otherwise
eCurrentDatthClassLengtStartDate =+ )(   
Eq. 4.2b ICDCGraduationRate(t) = 
( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*1000 tnngAttritioICDCTraini if
otherwise
eCurrentDatStartDate =+ 21  
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 Garamone has stated that active duty attrition has not been a problem with the 
security services in Iraq (Garamone, 2003:1).  For this reason the active duty attrition rate 
parameter for the ICDC in this notional analysis, given by equation 4.3, is assumed to be 
a Poisson distributed random variable with a mean and variance of zero. 
 Eq. 4.3 ICDCAttritionRate(t) ~ Poisson(ICDCAttritionRateParameter(t)) 
 Where 
  ICDCAttritionRateParameter(t) = 0 
The ICDCAttritionRate is a function of the time period.  In this notional example the 
ICDCAttritionRate has been effectively set at 0 for all time periods.  However, another 
distribution could be used to fit the scenario being investigated. 
The Iraqi Army undergoes a similar training program to the ICDC.  The Army is 
trained at the battalion level.  About 1000 recruits enter each class to produce an active 
battalion of 757 troops (Eaton, 2004:2).  Officers, non-commissioned officers, and 
enlisted men are first trained separately.  They are then all integrated and train together 
for three additional weeks before they graduate and enter active duty (Eaton, 2004:3).  
The coalition has the capacity to train three battalions simultaneously (Eaton, 2004:3).  
As of the end of January three battalions had graduated and three more were being 
trained (Eaton, 2004:3).  The coalition plans to use these first battalions as a cadre that 
will eventually train more units until the goal of nine infantry brigades of three battalions 
each is reached (Eaton, 2004:2;Combined Joint Task Force 7, 2003:2).  Attrition for the 
Iraqi Army training program has been as high as 50%, but generally has averaged about 
between 20% and 25%, which the Army has said is a typical attrition rate based on the 
type of recruiting and training involved (Eaton, 2004:13).  The attrition rate for the Iraqi 
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Army training program in this notional scenario is given by the variable 
IMilTrainingAttrition and has been modeled as a triangularly distributed random variable 
with a minimum of 0, a mean of 0.25, and a maximum of 0.5, to reflect the attrition rates 
observed in the Iraqi Army training program.   
This model assumes that the coalition is able to induce as many Iraqis to join the 
Army as can be trained.  In order to keep a 60 day training program with three classes of 
1000 recruits each full, 50 trainees need to be recruited each day.  The Iraqi Army 
recruitment rate is given by equation 4.4a and 4.4b. 
Eq. 4.4a IraqiArmyRecruitRate(t)= 
(IMilClassSize(t) * #OfIMilClasses(t))/ClassLength(t) 
Eq. 4.4b IraqiArmyRecruitRate(t) = ( 1000 * 3 ) / 60 = 50 
The graduation rate for the Iraqi Army is given by equations 4.5a and 4.5b. 
Eq. 4.5a IraqiArmyGraduationRate(t) = 
  ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*)( tnngAttritioIMilTrainitClassSize if
otherwise
eCurrentDatthClassLengtStartDate =+ )(   
Eq. 4.5b IraqiArmyGraduationRate(t) = 
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*1000 tnngAttritioIMilTraini if
otherwise
eCurrentDatStartDate =+ 60  
 News reports have suggested that active duty attrition has not been a problem 
with the security services in Iraq (Garamone, 2003:1).  As a result the attrition rate 
parameter for the Iraqi Army in this scenario, given by equation 4.6, is assumed to be 
zero. 
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 Eq. 4.6  IraqiArmyAttritionRate(t) ~ Poisson(IraqiArmyAttritionRateParameter(t)) 
 Where 
  IraqiArmyAttritionRateParameter(t) = 0 
The Facility Protection Service (FPS) personnel go through a three day training 
course before they are used to guard government buildings and facilities (Ministry of 
Interior, 2004:5).  The training course includes “instruction in hand-to-hand combat, 
weapons familiarization, professional conduct, and personal interaction” (DoD, 2003:4).  
This very short training course has enabled the coalition to quickly train a large number 
of FPS troops. By the beginning of February 2004 there were 97,800 FPS personnel 
working throughout Iraq (Brookings Institution, 2004:11). 
This notional analysis assumes that the coalition can train three classes of 1000 
FPS recruits simultaneously, and that it can induce enough Iraqis to enroll in the training 
program to keep all the classes full.  The FPS recruitment rate required to keep these 
classes full is given generally by equation 4.7a and specifically for this scenario by 4.7b 
and is 1000 new recruits per day. 
Eq. 4.7a FPSRecruitRate(t) =( ClassSize(t) * #OfClasses(t))/ClassLength(t) 
Eq. 4.7b FPSRecruitRate(t)= (1000*3) / 3 = 1000 
The attrition rate for the FPS training program is given by the variable 
FPSTrainingAttrition and is assumed to be a triangularly distributed random variable 
with a minimum of 0, a mean of 0.25, and a maximum of 0.5.  The graduation rate for the 
FPS is stated in general by equation 4.8a and is reexpressed for this specific excersice in 
4.8b. 
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Eq. 4.8a FPSGraduationRate(t) =  
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*)( tgAttritionFPSTrainintClassSize if
otherwise
eCurrentDatthClassLengtStartDate =+ )(   
Eq. 4.8b FPSGraduationRate(t) =  
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*1000 tgAttritionFPSTrainin if
otherwise
eCurrentDatStartDate =+ 3   
 Continuing with the assumption that active duty attrition has not been a problem 
for the security services in Iraq, the active duty attrition rate for the FPS in this model, 
given by equation 4.9, is also set to be zero (Garamone,2003:1).   
 Eq. 4.9 FPSAttritionRate(t) ~ Poisson(FPSAttritionRateParameter(t) ) 
 Where 
  FPSAttritionRateParameter(t) = 0 
The Iraqi Border Police initially go through the standard eight week police 
training program followed by “an additional two weeks of post academy training 
specifically tailored for border police officers” (Ministry of Interior, 2004:4).  By the 
beginning of February 2004 there were 21,000 Iraqi Border Police working to secure 
Iraq’s borders (Brookings Institution, 2004:11).  The eventual goal is a force of 25,000 
border police (Brookings Institution, 2004:11). 
For this notional example it is assumed that ten classes of 1,000 Iraqi Border 
Police trainees can be trained simultaneously, and that there are enough recruits to fill 
these classes.  This assumption is based on the open source data available on the training 
rates of Iraqi Border Police (Brookings Institution, 2004:11).  Of course, these parameters 
can be modified to fit the scenario being modeled.  For this scenario the Iraqi Border 
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Police recruit rate is given in general by equation 4.10a and tailored for this analysis in 
4.10b. 
Eq. 4.10a IBPRecruitRate(t) = (ClassSize(t) * #OfClasses(t))/ClassLength(t) 
Eq. 4.10b IBPRecruitRate(t) = ( 1000 * 10 ) / 70 = 143 
The attrition rate for the Iraqi Border Police training program is given by the 
variable IBPTrainingAttrition and is assumed to be a triangularly distributed random 
variable with a minimum of 0, a mean of 0.25, and a maximum of 0.5.  The graduation 
rate for the Iraqi Border Police is given by equation 4.11. 
Eq. 4.11a IBPGraduationRate(t) =  
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*)( tgAttritionIBPTrainintClassSize if
otherwise
eCurrentDatthClassLengtStartDate =+ )(   
 
Eq. 4.11b IBPGraduationRate(t) =   
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*1000 tgAttritionIBPTrainin if
otherwise
eCurrentDatStartDate =+ 70   
 The active duty attrition rate parameter for the Iraqi Border Police in this notional 
example is given by equation 4.12 and is assumed to be zero, based on news reports of 
the active duty attrition rates of the Iraqi security forces (Garamone, 2003:1). 
 Eq. 4.12 IBPAttritionRate(t) ~ Poisson(IBPAttritionRateParameter(t)) 
 Where 
  IBPAttritionRateParameter(t) = 0 
 Open source data is not available for the number of casualties of each Iraqi 
security service, but the Brookings Institution gives a rough estimate that about 200 Iraqi 
security service personnel were killed in the months of December 2003 and January 2004 
(2004:4).  In the same months Iraq’s security services were typically attacked two to four 
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times per day nationwide (Brookings Institution, 2004:7).  If over a two month period the 
Iraqi security services were attacked three times per day and there was, on average, one 
casualty per attack there would be close to 200 casualties over that time period.  This is 
consistent with the limited open source data available on the number of Iraqi security 
force casualties.  In this scenario the daily number of casualties in the Iraqi security 
forces is assumed to be a Poisson distributed random variable with a mean of one times 
that day’s number of insurgent attacks against Iraqi security forces.  The daily Iraqi 
security force casualties are then randomly applied to one of the four security forces or 
the Iraqi Police.  The Iraqi Police are discussed in the following section, and the number 
of insurgent attacks on Iraqi security forces are discussed in the insurgent and coalition 
military section.  The daily casualty rate for the Iraqi security forces is given by Equation 
4.13. 
Eq. 4.13 IraqiSecurityForceCasualties(t) ~ Poisson(InsurgentAttacksOnIraqiSF(t))  
 Law Enforcement 
 Establishing law and order is critical in Iraq.  “The fear Iraqis have of crime and 
lawlessness is, without question, the single greatest impediment to social, political, and 
economic reconstruction in Iraq today” (Pollak, 2004:12).  If the coalition is unable to 
solve Iraq’s crime problems then ordinary Iraqis may “seek protection behind local 
militias of one sort or another—which would spell the end of reconstruction and be the 
first step on the road to civil war” (Pollak, 2004:12). 
The cornerstone of the coalition’s strategy to enforce law and order in Iraq is the 
Iraqi Police Service.  The Iraqi Police Service recruits new police officers and 
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experienced police officers.  New police officers undergo an eight week training program 
(Interior Ministry, 2004:1).  It is assumed in this illustrative example that the new police 
officer training course can train three classes of 1,500 recruits each simultaneously, and 
that there is a four day lag between the end of training and when new police officers enter 
active duty. Experienced police officers undergo a three week training program to 
educate recruits on “international standards of human rights, modern policing techniques, 
and Iraqi criminal law and procedure” (Interior Ministry, 2004:1).  The three week 
training program can train 3,000 recruits simultaneously (Interior Ministry, 2004:1). In 
this scenario it is assumed that the 3,000 recruits are trained in concurrent classes of 
1,000 recruits each. 
This analysis assumes that the coalition can recruit enough trainees to keep both 
of these training programs full.  That translates to 75 new trainees and 143 experienced 
trainees recruited each day.  The new and experienced Iraqi police officer trainee 
recruitment rates are given by equations 4.14 and 4.15 respectively. 
Eq. 4.14a NewIPORecruitRate(t) = (ClassSize(t) * #OfClasses(t))/ClassLength(t) 
Eq. 4.14b NewIPORecruitRate(t) = (1500 * 3 ) / 60 = 75 
Eq. 4.15a ExperiencedIPORecruitRate(t) = (ClassSize(t) * #OfClasses(t))/ClassLength(t) 
Eq. 4.15b ExperiencedIPORecruitRate(t) = ( 1000 * 3 ) / 21 = 143 
The attrition rates for both of these programs are NewIPOTrainingAttritionRate and 
EIPOTrainingAttritionRate, respectively.  It has been assumed that these values are 
triangularly distributed random variables with minimum values of 0, means of 0.25, and 
maximum values of 0.5.  The Iraqi police officer graduation rate is the sum of the new 
police officer training program graduation rate and the experienced police officer training 
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program graduation rate.  It is given in general by equation 4.16a and specifically for this 
scenario in 4.16b. 
 Eq. 4.16a IPOGradRate(t) = NewIPOGradRate(t) + ExperiencedIPOGradRate(t)  
Where 
 NewIPOGradRate(t)=  
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*)( tionningAttritNewIPOTraitClassSize if
otherwise
eCurrentDatthClassLengtStartDate =+ )(  
 ExperiencedIPOGradRate(t)= 
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*)( tnngAttritioEIPOTrainitClassSize if
otherwise
eCurrentDatthClassLengtStartDate =+ )(  
Eq. 4.16b IPOGradRate(t) = NewIPOGradRate(t) + ExperiencedIPOGradRate(t)  
 Where 
 NewIPOGradRate(t)= ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*1500 tionningAttritNewIPOTrai if
otherwise
eCurrentDatStartDate =+ 60  
 ExperiencedIPOGradRate(t)= 
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*1000 tnngAttritioEIPOTraini if
otherwise
eCurrentDatStartDate =+ 21  
In this model active duty attrition is assumed to not be a problem.  An interesting addition 
to the model would be to make the active duty attrition rate a dynamic function of the 
police officer casualty rate, the salary paid police officers, and the police officer work 
load. 
Eq. 4.17 IPOAttritionRate(t) ~ Poisson(IPOAttritionRateParameter(t)) 
 Where 
  IPOAttritionRateParameter(t) = 0 
 The criminal recruitment rate is the rate at which unemployed people stop looking 
for jobs and start supporting themselves through crime.  In this notional scenario it has 
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been assumed that every day between two and three unemployed people per thousand 
become criminals.  Of those people who become criminals or who already are criminals, 
two criminals per criminal apprehended the previous day leave criminal status and return 
to unemployed status.  The criminal recruitment rate assumed by this model is given by 
equation 4.18. 
Eq. 4.18 CriminalRecruitRate(t) = ( * UnemploymentLevel – CAppEffectParameter* 
 CriminalApprehensionRate *  
1U
)1−CurrentDay 1T
Where 
 ~ Uniform(0.002,0.003) 1U
 CAppEffectParameter = 2 
 ~ Triangular(.5,1,1.5) 1T
While there is evidence that suggests that the rate at which people choose to become 
criminals is affected by their economic situation and their probability of apprehension, 
the exact relationship given above is notional (Neumayer, 2003:635).  Further research 
needs to be done to investigate the validity of this notional relationship.  As a result of 
this uncertainty the criminal recruitment rate varies by plus or minus 50%. 
The criminal apprehension rate is assumed to be the rate at which criminals are 
arrested by Iraqi police, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and coalition military forces 
conducting crime suppression operations.  According to FBI data on reported crimes and 
arrests in 59 large U.S. cities, about 20% of reported violent crimes result in an arrest 
(Levitt, 1995:32).  The stated goal of the coalition is to ultimately train a force of about 
110,000 police and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps personnel to maintain law and order in Iraq 
(Brookings Institution, 2004:11).  This scenario assumes that 110,000 police and ICDC 
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personnel will be able to achieve a similar ratio of arrests per criminals.  This similar 
ratio of arrests can be approximately attained if each group of 11,000 police and ICDC 
personnel in this scenario can apprehend between one and three percent of the criminals 
in Iraq each day, never exceeding one arrest per ten police and ICDC personnel.  The 
criminal apprehension rate is then given by equation 4.19.  
Eq. 4.19 CriminalApprehensionRate(t) = Criminals(t) * 
)
)(
)()()((
tametereEffectParPoliceForc
ticingilitaryPolCoalitionMtICDCLeveltIPOLevel ++ *  1U
Such that  
 CriminalApprehensionRate(t) ≤   
  )
)(min
)()()((
talrioCaptureACMinPoliceT
ticingilitaryPolCoalitionMtICDCLeveltIPOLevel ++  
 PoliceForceEffectParameter(t) = 1 
 ~ Uniform(0.01,0.03) 1U
 MinPoliceToCaptureACriminal(t) = 10 
The criminal apprehension rate given in equation 4.19 is notional.  Further research is 
needed to determine the actual apprehension rate. 
 The criminal release rate gives the rate at which criminals who have been arrested 
are released back into the general population.  This rate includes people who were 
arrested and released because they were found to be innocent, people who were arrested 
stood trial and were acquitted, and people who were arrested convicted and have finished 
their sentences.  This scenario assumes that every day between zero and five percent of 
the incarcerated criminals are released into the pool of unemployed persons.  Equation 
4.20 gives the criminal release rate. 
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 Eq. 4.20    CriminalReleaseRate(t) = (IncarceratedCriminalsLevel(t) ⋅) 1U   
Where 
  ~ Uniform(0,0.05) 1U
This release rate is notional and can be adjusted to various levels to simulate alternative 
levels of prosecutorial effectiveness and punishment severity. 
A lack of reliable open source data exists on the crime rate in post-conflict Iraq.  
The Brookings Institute reports that one of the few open source statistics that was 
available between May 2003 and January 2004 is a rough estimate of the number of 
crime related deaths in Baghdad (Brookings Institute, 2004:12).  This number was 
calculated based on the number of bodies with fatal gunshot wounds brought to morgues 
in the Baghdad area, recognizing that not all bodies brought to morgues are victims and 
not all victims are brought to morgues (Brookings institution, 2004:12).  The scenario 
analyzed here uses the number of crime related deaths as a proxy for the violent crime 
rate.  It is assumed that each criminal and insurgent is responsible for an average of 
between 0.25 and one crime related deaths each year.  Included in this rate is also the 
casualty rate of Iraqi security forces, and deaths as a result of insurgent attacks on the 
civilian population.  In this notional example it is assumed that on average 20 civilians 
are killed as a result of each insurgent attack on the civilian population.  The crime 
related death rate is given by equation 4.21 and is calculated as a proxy for the amount of 
crime in Iraq.  The ISF casualty rate is applied to the Iraqi security force levels in the 
Iraqi security forces sub model. 
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Eq. 4.21   CrimeRelatedDeathRate(t) =  
)
365
1( * (Criminals(t) + Insurgents(t)) *  + ISFCasualtyRate(t)+  1U 1P
 Where 
  ~ Uniform(0.25,1) 1U
 ~ Poisson(InsurgentAttackCivEffectParameter(t)*InsurgentAttacksCivilians(t)) 1P
  InsurgentAttackCivEffectParameter(t) = 20 
 The last equation in the law enforcement sub-model describes the number of 
coalition troops that are being used to conduct crime suppression operations.  Pollack 
reports that in Iraq from May 2003 to January 2004 few coalition forces were employed 
in crime suppression operations (Pollak, 2004:13).  It is assumed in this notional scenario 
that 5% of coalition troops are employed in crime suppression operations as shown in 
equation 4.22. 
 Eq. 4.22 CoalitionTroopsPolicing(t) = 
 %OfCoalitionTroopsSupressingCrime(t)*TotalCoalitionTroops(t) 
 Where 
  %OfCoalitionTroopsSupressingCrime(t) = .05 
 Insurgent and Coalition Military Activities 
 Insurgent and coalition military activities are represented in this scenario by three 
level values and six rates of change.  The level values are the number of coalition troops 
in Iraq, the assumed number of insurgents in Iraq, and the number of insurgents being 
detained by the coalition.  The rates of change are: (1) the coalition troop rate of change, 
(2) the coalition troop casualty rate, (3) the insurgent recruitment rate, (4) the 
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international insurgent rate of change, (5) the insurgent apprehension rate, and (6) the 
detained insurgent release rate. 
The coalition troop level is influenced by two rates of change: (1) the coalition 
troops in country rate of change and (2) the coalition troop casualty rate.  The coalition 
troop rate of change represents the rate at which coalition troops are arriving or departing 
the country, and the coalition casualty rate is the rate at which coalition troops are being 
killed or wounded.  These two rates can be set at different levels to investigate the effects 
of a troop build-up or a troop draw-down.  For this scenario run the number of coalition 
troops in Iraq was be held constant by setting the coalition troop rate of change equal to 
the coalition troop casualty rate.  The coalition troop rate of change is given by equation 
4.23. 
Eq. 4.23 CoalitionTroopRateOfChange(t) = CoalitionTroopCasualtyRate(t) 
This formulation of the CoalitionTroopRateOfChange effectively maintains the coalition 
troop manning level. 
The coalition troop casualty rate is a function of the number of insurgent attacks 
that are made on coalition troops.  According to the Brookings Institute, in the months of 
August 2003 through January 2004 an average of five fatalities resulted from each 100 
attacks on U.S. troops, with an average of eight troops wounded for each fatality 
(Brookings Institution, 2004:3-6).  Therefore, on the average there were 0.4 casualties per 
attack on U.S. troops.  In this example it has been assumed that all coalition troops have a 
similar average casualties per attack, and that the coalition troop casualties per attack is a 
Poisson distributed random variable with a mean of 0.4 times the daily number of 
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insurgent attacks against coalition troops.  For this scenario the coalition troop casualty 
rate is given by equation 4.24. 
Eq. 4.24 CoalitionTroopCasualtyRate(t) ~  
 Poisson(AvgCasualtiesPerAttack(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacksOnCoalitionTroops(t)) 
Where 
 AvgCasualtiesPerAttack(t) = 0.4 
 The insurgent recruitment rate is the rate at which people transition from 
unemployed status to insurgent status.  For this analysis insurgents are defined as anyone, 
regardless of their motivation, attempting to thwart the coalition through violent means.    
In the case of Iraq some of the people attempting to thwart the coalition through violence 
are motivated by political beliefs, some by religious beliefs, some by the potential for 
financial gain, and some by a combination of these three.   In this analysis all of these 
people are included in the insurgent category. 
 Similar to how the criminal recruitment rate was modeled in the law enforcement 
sub-model, in this notional example every day between two and three people per 10,000 
who have become dissatisfied with the occupation consider joining the insurgency.  
There is no open source data on the rate at which people join the insurgency so this 
number has been approximated based on monthly estimates of insurgent strength reported 
by the Brookings Institution (2004:10).  Of the people who either are considering 
becoming insurgents or already are insurgents, a percentage of them reconsider their 
decision and decide not to participate in the insurgency.  The total number of insurgents 
who reconsider is a function of the number of insurgents captured the previous day.  As a 
result the insurgent recruitment rate can be negative.  A negative insurgent recruitment 
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rate would represent people choosing to leave the insurgency and transition to 
unemployed status.  The insurgent recruitment rate is given by equation 4.25. 
Eq. 4.25 InsurgentRecruitmentRate(t) = ( * DissatisfiedPeople(t) -
*InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate *  
1U
2U )1−CurrentDay 1T
 Where 
  ~ Uniform(0.0002,0.0003) 1U
  ~ Uniform(0,1) 2U
  ~ Triangular(0.5,1,1.5) 1T
Formulating the insurgent recruitment rate as a function of the number of dissatisfied 
people and the insurgent apprehension rate is consistent with the research done by 
Epstein, Steinbruner, and Parker (2001:3-5).  Epstein, Steinbruner, and Parker, in an 
agent based simulation on civil violence, made the choice of whether each agent revolted 
or not based on, among other things, that agent’s level of grievance and their perceived 
chance of being arrested for revolting (2001:3-5).  Because of the uncertainty of the 
insurgent recruitment rate, it has been allowed to vary by plus or minus 50%. 
 The international insurgent rate of change depicts the rate at which people are 
coming to Iraq to join the insurgency.  The number of international insurgent that try to 
enter Iraq is assumed to be determined by social and political dynamics that are 
exogenous to the model.  In a statement made on 19 December 2003, the U.S. military 
said that of the almost 9,000 suspected insurgents it has detained, about 200 to 300 of 
them were foreign nationals (Kimmitt, 2003:9).  In addition, it has been estimated that 
about 90% of the insurgents in Iraq are former regime loyalists (Brookings Institution, 
 82
2004:10).  In this analysis it has been assumed that every day between zero and ten 
international insurgents try to enter Iraq, and that the number that succeed in entering the 
country is a function of the number of Iraqi border police and coalition troops patrolling 
the borders.  The international insurgent rate of change is given by equation 4.26. 
 Eq. 4.26 InternationalInsurgentRateOfChange(t) =  *  1D
  
))()(rameter(t)BPEffectPa(
rameter(t)BPEffectPa
tIraqiBPtrsllingBorderoopsPatroCoalitionT ++
  
 Where 
  ~ DiscreteUniform(0,10) 1D
  BPEffectParameter(t) = 10,000 
This scenario notionally assumes that 10,000 troops patrolling Iraq’s borders will be able 
to stop 50% of the international insurgents trying to enter Iraq, that 20,000 troops will be 
able to stop 66% of the insurgents trying to enter Iraq, and that 30,000 troops will be able 
to stop 75% of the insurgents trying to enter Iraq.  
 The insurgent detained or killed rate is the rate that insurgents are detained or 
killed by the coalition and the Iraqi security forces.  This rate is a function of the number 
of insurgents in the country, the number of coalition troops and Iraqi security forces 
conducting counter insurgency operations, and the number of tips the coalition receives 
on insurgent activity.  For each month between May 2003 and January 2004 the coalition 
detained or killed between 750 and 2,000 suspected insurgents, averaging just over 1000 
per month (Brookings Institution, 2004:10).   It has been assumed in this scenario that 
without any tips on insurgent activity each group of 30,000 troops conducting counter 
insurgency operations can apprehend between 0.05% and 0.15% of the insurgents in Iraq 
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each day.  As there is no open source data on the effectiveness of troops at apprehending 
insurgents, this number has been approximated based on assumed insurgent levels and 
reported insurgent apprehensions.  The insurgent apprehension rate is given by equation 
4.27. 
Eq. 4.27 InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) =Insurgents(t) * 
CounterInsurgencyEffectParameter(t) * (CoalitionTroopsCounterInsurgency(t) + 
IraqiArmyTroops(t) + ICDCTroopEffectParameter(t) * ICDCTroops) *  +  1U 1P
 Where 
  CounterInsurgencyEffectParameter(t) = 10,000 
  ICDCTroopEffectParameter(t) = 0.5 
  ~ Uniform(0.0005,0.0015) 1U
  ~ Poisson(AvgApprehensionsPerTip(t) * TipsOnInsurgentActivity(t)) 1P
  AvgApprehensionsPerTip(t) = 0.3 
 It has also been assumed that, on average, three tips in ten leads to the successful 
apprehension of an insurgent.  The Brookings Institution has reported that in late spring 
and early summer about half of all intelligence leads were productive (2004:7).  The tip 
effectiveness parameter in this scenario has been chosen as a conservative estimate, as it 
has been assumed that not all tips are actionable intelligence leads.   
 In this notional example it is assumed that of the total number of insurgents that 
are killed or detained each day, zero to two percent of them are killed.  The number of 
insurgents killed in operations each day is given by equation 4.28. 
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Eq. 4.28 InsurgentKilledRate(t) = * InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) 1U
 Where 
  ~ Uniform(0,0.02)  1U
 The detained insurgent release rate gives the rate the detained insurgents are 
released back into the pool of unemployed persons.   This rate is determined directly by 
the coalition, as it can decide how many detainees it will release each day.  In this 
scenario it is assumed that on average one out of three detainees is released each day.  
The detained insurgent release rate is given by equation 4.29. 
Eq. 4.29 DetainedInsurgentReleaseRate(t)  ~ Poisson(DetainedInsurgentReleaseRateParameter(t) * 
DetainedInsurgents(t)) 
Where 
 DetainedInsurgentReleaseRateParameter(t) = 0.33 
 In January 2004 U.S. troops were attacked an average of 18 times per day, Iraqi 
security forces were attacked an average of 4 times per day, Iraqi civilians were attacked 
an average of 1 time per day, and Iraq’s oil infrastructure was attacked twice in the whole 
month (Brookings Institution, 2004:6-7).  That is an average of about 23 attacks per day, 
with roughly 78% of attacks being directed at U.S. troops, 17% of attacks being directed 
at Iraqi security forces, 4% of attacks being directed at Iraqi civilians, and 1% of attacks 
being directed at critical infrastructure.  In January 2004, 14 cells, each consisting of 
between 20 and 100 insurgents were believed to be operating in Baghdad, and between 
3,000 and 5,000 insurgents were thought to be operating nationwide (Brookings 
Institution, 2004:10).  If these numbers are accurate and there were 4,000 insurgents 
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operating nationwide in 100 cells of 40 insurgents each, and each cell was able to launch 
an attack every 4 days there would be about 25 attacks per day in Iraq. 
 It is assumed in this example that insurgents organize themselves into cells of 40, 
that each cell can launch an attack on average every 4 days, and that on average 78% of 
attacks are directed at coalition troops, 17% of attacks are directed at Iraqi security forces, 
4% of attacks are directed at Iraqi civilians, and 1% of attacks are directed at critical 
infrastructure.  Based on these assumptions the daily insurgent attack rates on coalition 
troops, Iraqi security forces, Iraqi civilians, and critical infrastructure are given by 
equations 4.30, 4.31, 4.32, and 4.33 respectively. 
Eq. 4.30 InsurgentAttacksOnCoaltion(t) ~ Poisson(%OfAttacksOnCoalition(t) 
*
)(
)(
tPerCellInsurgents
tInsurgents *AttacksPerDayPerCell(t)) 
 Where 
  %OfAttacksOnCoalition(t) = 0.78 
  InsurgentsPerCell(t) = 40 
  AttacksPerCellPerDay(t) = 0.25 
 
 Eq. 4.31 InsurgentAttacksOnIraqiSF(t) ~ Poisson(%OfAttacksOnIraqiSF(t)  
  *
)(
)(
tPerCellInsurgents
tInsurgents *AttacksPerDayPerCell(t)) 
 Where 
  %OfAttacksOnIraqiSF(t) = 0.17 
  InsurgentsPerCell(t) = 40 
  AttacksPerCellPerDay(t) = 0.25 
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Eq. 4.32 InsurgentAttacksCivilians(t) ~ Poisson(%OfAttacksOnCiv(t)  
  *
)(
)(
tPerCellInsurgents
tInsurgents * AttacksPerDayPerCell(t)) 
 Where 
  %OfAttacksOnCiv(t) = 0.04 
  InsurgentsPerCell(t) = 40 
  AttacksPerCellPerDay(t) = 0.25 
 Eq. 4.33 InsurgentAttacksInfrastructure(t) =  
1P *
)()(
)(
tFPSLeveltarameterFPSEffectP
tarameterFPSEffectP
+
 
 Where 
  ~ Poisson(%OfAttacksOnInf(t) *1P
)(
)(
tPerCellInsurgents
tInsurgents *AttacksPerDayPerCell(t)) 
  %OfAttacksOnInf(t) = 0.01 
  InsurgentsPerCell(t) = 40 
  AttacksPerCellPerDay(t) = 0.25 
  FPSEffectParameter(t) = 20,000 
The additional term in equation 4.33 represents the effect the Facility Protection Service 
troops have on foiling attacks on infrastructure targets.  This equation assumes that 
20,000 FPS troops could foil about 50% of infrastructure attacks and the coalition’s goal 
of 50,000 FPS troops could foil almost 75% of all infrastructure attacks (Brookings 
Institution, 2004:11). 
 Iraqi Labor Market 
 In this example it has been assumed that every member of Iraq’s labor force 
belongs to one of ten groups.  Each person is either (1) unemployed; (2) employed in the 
private sector; employed as a trainee or active duty member of the (3) Iraqi police, (4) 
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border police, (5) civil defense corps, (6) facility protection service, or (7) Iraqi Army; 
employed in a (8) non-security related government job; (9) a criminal; or an (10) 
insurgent.  Each person in the labor market is assumed to belong to one and only one of 
these categories.  However, as the scenario evolves over time, people move from one 
category to another as prescribed by the various rates of change. 
 The previous explanation of the Iraqi security institutions sub-model detailed how 
people move back and forth between unemployed status and trainee and active duty 
status in the Iraqi Border Police, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the Facility Protection 
Service, and the Iraqi Army.  The discussion of the law enforcement sub-model explained 
how people transition between unemployed status and criminal status, as well as Iraqi 
police officer trainee status and active duty Iraqi police officer status.  The presentation 
of the coalition military and insurgent activities sub-model outlined how people transition 
between unemployed status and insurgent status.  The only aspects of the labor market 
that have not yet been discussed are the effects of non-security related government jobs, 
private sector jobs, and the per capita gross domestic product.   
 The detailed dynamics of the standing up the new Iraqi government is beyond the 
scope of this model, and is left as an area for further research.  However, its direct effect 
with respect to the establishment of security is accounted for as a source of jobs.  The rate 
at which unemployed Iraqis are hired into government jobs is considered exogenous to 
the model and set directly by the modeler as the coalition can decide how many jobs it 
wishes to offer.  This example assumes that the initial Iraqi government has about as 
many non-security related personnel as it has security related personnel.  The coalition’s 
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stated goal is to train about 225,000 personnel in Iraqi security forces (Brookings 
Institution, 2004:10).  If the non-security related civil service is to be of about the same 
size and stood up over the course of 18 months, then the government will hire on average 
about 410 workers a day.  This example assumes that on average 410 qualified workers 
can be enticed to take a government job each day.  The hiring rate of the non-security 
related civil service is given by equation 4.34. 
 Eq. 4.34 Non-SecurityGovernmentRate(t) ~ Poisson(AvgGovtHireRate(t)) 
 Where 
  AvgGovtHireRate(t) = 410 
 In this analysis the growth in the number of private sector jobs is a function of the 
growth rate of the Iraqi gross domestic product.  The relationship between the rate of 
change of unemployment in a country and its growth rate of gross domestic product is 
often referred to as Okun’s law (Blanchard, 2000:25).  In the United States since 1960 a 
drop in the unemployment rate of about one percentage point has been associated with 
each 2.5 percent increase in the annualized GDP growth rate (Blanchard, 2000:26).  
Despite being termed a “law,” this relationship is an empirical rule, more a “rule of 
thumb,” than a binding fact of economics.  However, it makes sense that such a 
relationship should exist;  “High output growth leads to high employment growth, as 
firms hire more workers to produce more, and high employment growth leads to a 
decrease in unemployment” (Blanchard, 2000:25).  For this scenario it is assumed that 
every day for each increase of 1% in the GDP growth rate the number of private sector 
jobs will increase by one tenth of one percent, and for each decrease of 1% in the GDP 
growth rate the number of private sector jobs will decrease by one tenth of one percent.  
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The daily rate of change of the number of private sector jobs in the economy is given by 
equation 4.35. 
Eq. 4.35 PrivateSectorHireRate(t) = (GDPGrowthEffectParameter(t) * PerCapGDPGrowth(t) * 
PrivateSectorJobs(t)) *  1T
Where 
 GDPGrowthEffectParameter(t) = 0.001 
 ~ Triangular(0.5,1,1.5) 1T
 In the scenario developed in this thesis, Iraq’s real per capita GDP growth rate is 
represented as a function of civil unrest, captured through the number of insurgent attacks 
and the crime rate, and the critical infrastructure levels.  According to Dalgaard and 
Hansen in their paper “On Aid, Growth and Good Policies” other influential factors that 
contribute to a country’s post-conflict economic growth rate include the country’s 
amount of ethnic fractionalization, the quality of its institutions, the level of its financial 
market development, its economic policy, and the amount of international aid it receives.  
These factors are all assumed to be constant throughout the course of this example 
simulation, and as a result are not modeled dynamically.  Clearly, an area for further 
research would be to expand the economic portion of this model by allowing these factors 
to evolve dynamically.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has forecasted a per 
capita GDP growth rate of 26% for Iraq in 2004, although qualifies this proposed growth 
rate as conditional on the security situation in Iraq improving and meeting its 
assumptions about oil and power production (International Monetary Fund, 2003:22). 
 For this analysis the International Monetary Fund’s estimate of a 26% GDP 
growth rate has been used as a baseline estimate for Iraq’s economic growth rate.  This 
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baseline growth rate is then adjusted according to the number of crime related deaths that 
take place and by the amount that Iraq’s oil production differs from the IMF’s estimate.  
The daily per capita GDP growth rate is given by equation 4.36. 
 Eq. 4.36 PerCapGDPRate(t) = 
365
)(tePGrowthRatBaselineGD  * PerCapGDPLevel(t) – 
  CrimeRelatedDeathEffectParameter(t)* (CrimeRelatedDeaths(t)) –  
( PriceOfABarrelOfOil(t)*(AssumedBPDOilProduced(t) –  
DailyOilDelivered(t)))/IraqiPopulation(t) 
 Where 
  CrimeRelatedDeathEffectParameter(t) = 0.000228 
  PriceOfABarrelOfOil(t) = 20.50 
  AssumedBPDOilProduced(t) = 2,000,000 
  IraqiPopulation(t)=25,000,000 
Equation 4.36 calculates the daily growth rate of per capita GDP as the IMF’s baseline 
estimate minus 0.0228% of GDP growth for every related death and $20.50 per barrel of 
oil short of the IMF’s assumed level of 2,000,000 barrels of oil produced per day.  These 
parameters are notional and further research needs to be done to investigate their validity.
 Critical Infrastructure
 The three critical infrastructures in Iraq that are included in this scenario are: (1) 
the water distribution infrastructure, (2) the electricity distribution infrastructure and (3) 
the oil production infrastructure. While there are other important infrastructures in Iraq, 
these three are considered most critical (Pollak, 2004:2).  This analysis represents the 
levels of these infrastructures with three variables: (1) the daily gallons of potable water 
distributed, (2) the daily number of megawatt hours of electricity being delivered in Iraq, 
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and (3) the number of barrels of crude oil per day produced in Iraq.  For each of these 
three critical infrastructures an estimate for how rapidly these infrastructures can be 
developed under peaceful circumstances is used as a baseline and the number of 
successful infrastructure attacks reduces and possibly reverses the development rate of 
each infrastructure. 
 The goal of the Civilian Provisional Authority in Iraq is to increase electric 
generation and distribution to 6,000 mega watts (MW) per day by the summer of 2004 
(Brookings Institution, 2004:15).  Achieving that level would mean a 100% increase from 
the July 2003 electricity production and distribution level of just over 3,000 MW per day.  
Such an increase requires an average increase of 8.2 MW per day.  For this notional 
analysis it is assumed that one in three insurgent attacks on infrastructure is an attack on 
the electrical infrastructure, and that each successful attack reduces the daily electricity 
production and distribution level between zero and ten percent.  The electricity 
development rate is given by equation 4.37. 
 Eq. 4.37   ElectricityDevelopmentRate(t) = -  * *DailyElectricDelivered(t) 1T 1P 1U
 Where 
  ~Triangular(MinElectricDev(t), MedElectricDev(t), MaxElectricDev(t)) 1T
 MinElectricDev(t) =4.1 
 MedElectricDev(t) = 8.2 
 MaxElectricDev(t) = 12.3 
 ~Poisson(InsurgentInfAttackEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentInfrastructureAttacks(t)) 1P
 InsurgentInfAttackEffectParameter(t) = 0.33 
  ~ Uniform(0,0.1) 1U
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 The electricity shortage in Iraq is given by equation 4.38 where 4,400 MW was 
the estimated electricity demand per day based on pre-war levels (Brookins Institution, 
2004:15).  The pre-war level of 4,400MW per day of electric production is used in this 
equation rather than the CPA’s goal of 6,000MW per day.  The electric shortage rate is 
used to approximate how much electricity production is short of its typical level.      
Eq. 4.38 ElectricShortage(t) = ElectricDemand(t) – DailyElectricDelivered(t) 
 Where 
  ElectricDemand(t) = 4,400 
 The Civilian Provisional Authority’s goal for crude oil production in Iraq is three 
million barrels per day by the end of 2004 (Brookings Institution, 2004:15).  Achieving 
this goal would require increasing crude oil production by on average about 5,000 barrels 
per day from the June 2003 level of 300,000 barrels per day.  This scenario assumes that 
one in three infrastructure attacks is made on Iraq’s oil infrastructure and that each attack 
on the oil infrastructure reduces oil production by between zero and ten percent.  The 
daily oil production development rate is given by equation 4.38. 
Eq. 4.39   OilDevelopmentRate(t) = -  * *DailyOilDelivered(t) 1T 1P 1U
 Where 
  ~Triangular(MinOilDev(t), MedOilDev(t), MaxOilDev(t)) 1T
 MinOilDev(t) =2500 
 MedOilDev(t) = 5000 
 MaxOilDev(t) = 7500 
 ~Poisson(InsurgentInfAttackEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentInfrastructureAttacks(t)) 1P
 InsurgentInfAttackEffectParameter(t) = 0.33 
 ~ Uniform(0, 0.1) 1U
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 The shortage of oil is given by equation 4.40, where 450,000 is the daily domestic 
demand for barrels of crude oil in Iraq (Brookings Institution, 2004:15).  450,000 barrels 
of oil per day has been used as it is the amount of crude oil consumed on average every 
day in Iraq.  The CPA’s goal of producing three million barrels of oil per day includes not 
only oil earmarked for domestic consumption but also oil that will be sold abroad.   
 Eq. 4.40 OilShortage(t) = OilDemand(t) – DailyOilDelivered(t) 
 Where 
  OilDemand(t) = 450,000  
As refining crude oil into various types of usable fuel requires electricity, a shortage in 
electricity produces a proportional shortage in the daily amount of oil produced. 
 The estimated pre-war potable water supply in Iraq was 12.9 million liters per day 
(Brookings Institution, 2004:16).  Immediately after the war in May 2003 it was reported 
that the potable water supply was four million liters per day.  By the end of June it was 
estimated that 13.2 million liters were available per day, and by the end of November 
21.4 million liters were available per day.  The improvement in potable water availability 
between May and June represents an average daily gain of 300,000 liters.  If it is assumed 
that one third of infrastructure attacks are directed at water infrastructure, and that each 
water infrastructure attack reduces water availability between zero and five percent then 
the water development rate is given by equation 4.41. 
 94
Eq. 4.41 WaterDevelopmentRate(t) = -  * *DailyWaterDelivered(t) 1T 1P 1U
 Where 
  ~Triangular(MinWaterDev(t), MedWaterDev(t), MaxWaterDev(t)) 1T
 MinWaterDev(t) =150,000 
 MedWaterDev(t) = 300,000 
 MaxWaterDev(t) = 450,000 
 ~Poisson(InsurgentInfAttackEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentInfrastructureAttacks(t)) 1P
 InsurgentInfAttackEffectParameter(t) = 0.33 
 ~ Uniform(0, 0.05) 1U
This scenario assumes that the quantity of water demanded equals the pre-war level of 
12.9 million liters of water per day.  Since some water pumps are electric, a shortage of 
electricity causes a proportional decrease in the level of water delivered per day.  The 
water shortage rate is given by equation 4.41. 
 Eq. 4.42 WaterShortage(t) = WaterDemand(t) – DailyWaterDelivered(t) 
 Where 
  WaterDemand(t)= 12,900,000 
 Iraqi Public Opinion 
 The public opinion sub-model influences the rest of the model in two ways.  The 
number of people who are dissatisfied with the occupation influences the insurgent rate of 
change and the number of people who are neutral to, or satisfied with, the occupation 
influences the number of tips the indigenous population gives on insurgent activities. 
 The public opinion rate of change has been modeled in this example as a function of 
nine variables: (1) the number of unemployed people, (2) the number of employed people, 
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(3) the number of crime related deaths, the shortage/surpluses of the critical resources of (4) 
water, (5) oil, and (6) electricity, and the delivered amounts of (7) water, (8) oil, and (9) 
electricity.  The public opinion rate of change is given by equations 4.43a through 4.43c.   
 Eq. 4.43a DissatisfactionPoints(t) = UnemploymentEffectParameter(t)*UnemployedPersons(t) +  
  CrimeRelatedDeathRateEffectParameter(t)*CrimeRelatedDeathRate(t)+ 
  WaterDeliveredEffectParameter(t)*WaterShortageRate(t) + 
  ElectricityDeliveredEffectParameter(t)*ElectricShortageRate(t) + 
  OilDeliveredEffectParameter(t)*OilShortageRate(t) 
 Eq. 4.43b SatisfactionPoints(t) = EmploymentEffectParameter(t)*EmployedPersons(t) +  
  WaterDeliveredEffectParameter(t)*DailyWaterDelivered(t) +  
  ElectricityDeliveredEffectParameter(t)*DailyElectricityDelivered(t) +  
  OilDeliveredEffectParameter(t)*DailyOilDelivered(t) 
Eq. 4.43c If DissatisfactionPoints(t) > SatisfactionPoints(t) Then 
  PublicOpinionRateOfChange(t) =  ( ( ( SatisfactionPoints(t) /DissatisfactionPoints(t) ) -1) 
* SatisfiedPeople(t) ) / PublicOpinionResponsivenessParameter(t) 
   Else If SatisfactionPoints(t)≥DissatisfactionPoints(t) Then 
  PublicOpinionRateOfChange(t) = - ( ( ( DissatisfactionPoints(t) / SatisfactionPoints(t) ) -1) 
* DissatisfiedPeople(t) ) / PublicOpinionResponsivenessParameter(t) 
 Where 
  UnemploymentEffectParameter(t) = 1 
  EmploymentEffectParameter(t) = 1 
  CrimeRelatedDeathRateEffectParameter(t) = 30,000 
  WaterDeliveredEffectParameter(t) = 0.5 
  ElectricityDeliveredEffectParameter(t) = 1445 
 OilDeliveredEffectParameter(t) = 14.44 
 PublicOpinionResponsivenessParameter(t) = 90 
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The dissatisfaction points approximates the gross number of people who have 
cause to be dissatisfied and the satisfaction points approximate the gross number of 
people who have cause to be satisfied.  The daily rate of change of public opinion is a 
function of the ratio of these two numbers and the number of people who are currently 
satisfied and dissatisfied. 
This example assumes that every day on average one in every 50,000 Iraqis who 
are neutral to or satisfied with the occupation per 10,000 insurgents will give the coalition 
a useful tip on insurgent activity, and that the average number of tips on insurgent activity 
will not exceed 1,000 per day.  The number of tips given by Iraqis on insurgent activity is 
given by equation 4.44. 
 Eq. 4.44 TipsOnInsurgentActivities(t) ~  
Poisson( Insurgents(t) * SatisfiedIraqis(t) * TipRateParameter(t) ) 
 Where 
  TipRateParameter(t) = 1 / 500,000,000 
  Insurgents(t) * SatisfiedIraqis(t) * TipRateParameter(t) ≤1,000 
 Other possible expansions, while not included in this “first-cut” model include the 
effects of the media, availability of schools, and other such factors.  While the example 
provided is limited, it can be used to conduct analysis and illustrate the potential strength 
of this approach.  The following screening experiment provides that illustration. 
Screening Experiment 
A system dynamics model like the one presented in this chapter could be 
employed to provide insight to a decision maker about the principle drivers to the 
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establishment of security in post-conflict reconstruction.  Such information would help 
decision makers effectively allocate their limited resources of money and manpower. 
In order to identify the principle drivers of security in the notional scenario 
detailed in this chapter, a screening experiment was designed to test the effects of various 
parameters in the model.  In this experiment, seven parameters were selected as factors of 
interest.  While others could have been selected, these were chosen to illustrate how key 
drivers can be identified with a screening experiment.  These parameters are: (1) the 
initial percentage of the population who is dissatisfied with the occupation, (2) the initial 
number of police officers, (3) the initial number of criminals, (4) the initial number of 
insurgents, (5) the baseline gross domestic product growth rate, (6) the training class 
sizes of the Iraqi security forces, and (7) the baseline infrastructure development rate. 
The number of days from the start of the post-conflict reconstruction until security 
was established was selected as the criteria for measuring the effects of these factors of 
interest.   For this experiment, security was said to have been established when the 
average number of deaths as a result of criminal and insurgent activity fell below a 
specified level for 30 days.  Washington DC has an annual murder rate of 43 per 100,000 
citizens which was used as a stopping criterion for this model (Brookings Institution, 
2004:12).  When the 30 day moving average of deaths as a result of criminal and 
insurgent activity falls below this rate, security is said to be established and the 
simulation is stopped.   
Three replications of a seven factor one-half fractional factorial design (27-1) were 
chosen for the screening experiment.  This experiment varied each of the seven factors of 
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interest between a low value and a high value, and recorded the output value.  This is a 
resolution VII design which enables one, two, and three factor interactions to be tested 
without the complications of lower order aliasing (Meyers and Montgomery, 2002:157). 
In the experiment the low value of the initial percentage of the population that 
was dissatisfied with the occupation was set at 30%.  This number was chosen to reflect 
the results of a State Department survey of Iraqis in November 2003.  In that survey 71% 
of respondents are reported to have said that they would feel less safe if the coalition left 
Iraq immediately (Brookings Institution, 2004:18).  The high value was arbitrarily set at a 
dissatisfaction level of 60%, so that the effects of a high dissatisfaction level could be 
explored. 
The low value of initial police officers was set at 10,000 to reflect the initial 
amount of police officers there were in Iraq in May 2003, at the beginning of the 
occupation.  The Brookings Institution reports that in May 2003 there were between 
7,000 and 9,000 police officers in Iraq (2004:11).  The high value was set at 30,000 so 
that the effect of an additional 20,000 police officers could be evaluated. 
The initial number of criminals was set at a low value of 50,000 and a high value 
of 100,000.  There is little data on the number of criminals there were in Iraq in May 
2003, so in this notional example the high value was set at twice the level of the low 
value enabling the effect of the initial number of criminals on the number of days until 
security is established to be tested. 
The low value of the baseline GDP growth rate was set at 26%.  This value 
reflects the International Monetary Fund’s forecast of the growth rate of Iraq’s economy 
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in 2004 (International Monetary Fund, 2003:22).  The high value was set at twice the low 
value to reflect an even more optimistic economic growth rate. 
 The low value of the training class sizes for the Iraqi security forces were set at 
the levels previously identified in this chapter.  The high values were set at twice the low 
values to enable the effects that faster training has on establishing security to be tested. 
 The low value of the baseline infrastructure development rate was set at the levels 
previously identified in the Critical Infrastructure section of this chapter.  The high levels 
were set at twice that to enable the effects that faster infrastructure development has on 
establishing security to be tested.  The high and low factor levels are summarized in table 
4.2. 
Table 4.2: Screening Experiment High and Low Factor Settings 
Factor Low High 
Initial Dissatisfied People  30% 60% 
Initial Police Officers  10,000 30,000 
Initial Criminals  50,000 100,000 
Initial Insurgents  10,000 20,000 
Baseline GDP Growth  26% 52% 
Baseline Iraqi Security Forces 
Class Size  1x 2x 
Baseline Critical Infrastructure 
Development Rate 1x 2x 
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Results 
 Three repetitions of each of the 64 design points were run for a total of 192 
simulation runs.  The output data is presented in figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Screening Experiment Output Histogram 
 
  The mean number of days until security was established for all of the simulations was 
317 days with a standard deviation of 80 days given the ranges of the factors set in this 
design and the functional relationships defined in this notional model. 
 This output data was fitted to the log-linear model expressed in equation 4.45 to 
identify the one, two, and three factor effects (Neter et al., 1996:308).  A is the initial 
number of dissatisfied people, B is the initial number of police officers, C is the initial 
number of criminals, D is the initial number of insurgents, E is the baseline GDP growth 
rate, F is the class size of the Iraqi security forces, and G is the baseline infrastructure 
development rate. 
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Where 
 I = {A,B,C,D,E,F,G} 
 The level of factor i≡iX Ι∈∀i  
It is assumed with this model that the four, five, six, and seven factor interactions are 
negligible and captured within the ε term. 
 The model had an R squared value of 0.98 with an F ratio of 110 indicating that it 
had significantly more explanatory power than the model Ln Y = εβ +0 .  Table 4.2 lists 
the estimates for the one, two, and three factor terms that were found to be significant at 
the 95% level of confidence.  All of the estimates for the one, two, and three factor terms 
are listed in Appendix C. 
Table 4.2: Significant Factor Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate p-value 
Intercept  5.727733 <.0001 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People 0.185359 <.0001 
B: Initial Police Officers -0.02877 <.0001 
C: Initial Criminals 0.012877 <.0001 
D: Initial Insurgents 0.029326 <.0001 
E: GDP Growth Rate -0.05763 <.0001 
F: ISF Training Rates -0.04549 <.0001 
G: Infrastructure Development Rate -0.12592 <.0001 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*E: GDP Growth Rate 0.016179 <.0001 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*G: Infrastructure Development Rate -0.02001 <.0001 
C: Initial Criminals*F: ISF Training Rates 0.006223 0.0345 
D: Initial Insurgents*G: Infrastructure Development Rate -0.01114 0.0002 
E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates 0.010438 0.0005 
E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.007491 0.0112 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates -0.01065 0.0004 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.00648 0.0278 
D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates -0.00841 0.0046 
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 The factor with the largest impact on how long it takes to establish security in the 
screening experiment, as seen in table 4.2, is the initial percent of the population that is 
dissatisfied with the occupation.  The next largest impact factor was the baseline 
infrastructure development rate.  The least influential factor was the initial number of 
criminals. 
 In this notional scenario, the number of people who are initially dissatisfied with 
the occupation has a significant impact on how long it takes to establish security in the 
post-conflict reconstruction.  While this value cannot be directly manipulated by coalition 
forces once the reconstruction has begun, it may be possible to influence these conditions 
by how the coalition troops conduct themselves prior to phase IV, and how rapidly they 
bring civilian support programs into effect for phase IV operations.  This result suggests 
that efforts to win over the populace during phase I, II, and III operations, coupled with 
the rapid establishment of reconstruction support, has a demonstrable effect on how much 
time establishing security is likely to take.   
 In this notional scenario, the critical infrastructure development rate after 
hostilities also had a significant impact on how quickly security was established.  This 
suggests that having an actionable plan in place to rapidly restore civilian utilities as soon 
as the hostilities are over could reduce the amount of time it takes to establish security 
and potentially save lives.  While a notional example, the model does show the power of 
this approach. 
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Summary 
 In this chapter the general model developed in Chapter III is applied to a notional 
scenario based on Operation Iraqi Freedom.  A screening experiment is designed and 
seven factors to the establishment of security are tested.  Of 16 significant individual and 
interaction effects, the initial amount of people who are dissatisfied with the occupation 
and the rate that critical infrastructures are restored are found to have the highest impact 
on how long it takes to establish security in a post-conflict reconstruction operation. 
 104
V. Conclusions 
 
Conclusions about the General Model and Its Application 
 This thesis effort developed a general model for simulating the establishment of 
security in a post-conflict reconstruction.  The relevant literature on post-conflict 
reconstruction was reviewed and a set of level values and rates of change were identified 
to begin to describe the dynamics of a post-conflict reconstruction.  This general model 
was then applied to a notional scenario to illustrate how such a model could be employed 
to provide insight about potential policy alternatives to a decision maker.  A screening 
experiment was designed to identify key factors that influence how long it takes to 
establish security in the notional post-conflict reconstruction scenario.  The statistical 
significance of these factors was tested and notional policy implications were inferred.  
The runs of this notional scenario demonstrated the dynamic interactions that such a 
model can simulate. 
 The model developed allows an analyst to take a very complex problem and gain 
insight into it by dividing it into manageable component parts.  This enables an analyst to 
aggregate assumptions about simpler questions such as the effectiveness of troops, the 
growth rate of an economy, and construction of infrastructure into an estimate for 
answering more complex questions, such as, “How long will it take to establish security 
in Iraq?”    
The model developed in this thesis requires data on a wide range of subjects.  
Data is needed on the effectiveness of troops, police officers, and other types of security 
 105
forces.  Economic data is required to model the growth of a country’s economy 
dynamically.  Data on the construction of infrastructure is needed, as is public opinion 
data.  Not all of this data is available, but the development of the general model and the 
application of this model to the notional scenario highlight what data is needed.  It also 
identifies information needs for future post-conflict operations. 
 If the general model developed by this thesis were applied to a scenario using 
operational data, a wide variety of potential policy alternatives could be identified and 
tested.  Bounds could be set on how long establishing security is likely to take, the 
amount of resources needed to produce an outcome could be estimated, and assumptions 
about various aspects of stability operations could be tested.  The application of such a 
model could help decision makers employ forces more effectively, saving money and, 
more importantly, lives. 
 
Areas for Further Research 
 This thesis effort is a first step at developing a comprehensive post-conflict 
reconstruction model.  Its greatest contribution is as a jumping off point for further 
research into how to simulate post-conflict reconstruction.  Besides applying the model to 
operational data, one of the most promising areas for follow on research is in expanding 
the general model.  The general model developed in this thesis can be expanded in two 
general directions: it can be expanded by increasing the model’s resolution and it can be 
expanded by increasing the model’s scope. 
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 The general model proposed here is a high level model.  It can be applied to a 
scenario to infer macro level policy implications, such as how quickly police officers 
need to be trained, but its resolution is insufficient to provide insight on more micro level 
decisions, such as where those police officers should be deployed throughout the country.  
One way to increase the resolution of this model is to include different regions of the 
country as separate but interconnected parts of the whole.  Different ethnic groups in 
different parts of the country could be modeled individually, allowing security to be 
established in the model in one or two regions of a country while other regions are still 
volatile. 
 Another way that the resolution of this model could be increased would be by 
modeling the effectiveness of different types of troops differently.  For instance, a 
military police officer could be modeled to be more effective in a crime suppression role 
than an artillery officer in a crime suppression role.  Different training programs could 
also be modeled to create troops with different skill sets.  An indigenous border guard 
trainee who has undergone a three month training program could be modeled as being 
more effective than an indigenous border guard trainee who has only undergone a week 
long training program.  Other effects such as equipment, experience, and the number of 
translators could all be included to increase the model’s capabilities. 
 In addition to expanding the model’s resolution, the model’s scope could be 
expanded.  The model proposed by this thesis is primarily focused at simulating only one 
of the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction.  The other three pillars could be 
included.  For instance, governance and participation could be included in the model by 
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simulating the standing up of various parts of a government prior to holding elections.  
The mood of the populace could be simulated dynamically and could be used to simulate 
the outcome of an election.  The economic aspects of the model could be expanded to 
simulate the longer term recovery of a country’s economy.  A larger set of infrastructures 
could be included, such as communications, the media, transportation, education, 
agriculture, and manufacturing. 
This thesis has demonstrated the potential of this approach.  History has shown that 
effective post-conflict reconstruction is critical not only in the nations where conflict has 
occurred, but also for long term global stability.  Modeling efforts that can help decision 
makers more effectively execute the re-establishment of stable nations should be perused.
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Appendix A: General Model State Variables 
 
BorderPatrolPersonnel – The number of active duty troops in the indigenous border 
patrol. 
CivilDefensePersonnel – The number of active duty troops in the indigenous civil 
defense force. 
IndigenousMilitaryPersonnel – The number of active duty troops in the indigenous 
military. 
BorderPatrolPersonnelInTraining – The number of potential indigenous border patrol 
troops training to become active duty border patrol troops. 
CivilDefensePersonnelInTraining – The number of potential indigenous civil defense 
troops training to become active duty civil defense troops. 
IndigenousMilitaryPersonnelInTraining – The number of potential indigenous military 
troops training to become active duty military troops. 
PoliceOfficers – The number of active duty indigenous police officers.  
PoliceOfficersInTraining – The number of indigenous police officers in training. 
Criminals – The number of people supporting themselves through crime. 
IncarceratedCriminals – The number of criminals and suspected criminals who are being 
detained awaiting trial or being jailed as part of a prison sentence. 
Unemployed Persons – The number of people who want jobs who do not have them, 
including people who are actively looking for a job and people who have given up 
looking for a job, but still want one. 
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GovernmentEmployees – The number of non-security related government employees. 
PrivateSectorEmployees – The number of people employed by the private sector.  
Includes people who are employed by a firm that is fulfilling a government 
contract. 
Insurgents – The number of people who are actively working to thwart the coalition 
through violence, regardless of their motivation. 
DetainedInsurgents – The number of insurgents and suspected insurgents that are being 
held by the coalition. 
PerCapitaGDP – The total dollar value of goods and services produced within the 
country’s borders divided by the country’s population. 
CoalitionMilitaryForces – The total number of coalition troops in the country. 
DailyWaterDelivered – The number of gallons of potable water distributed every day in 
the country. 
DailyFoodDelivered – The number of tons of food distributed every day in the country. 
DailyFuelDelivered – The number of gallons of fuel distributed every day in the countery. 
DailyElectricityDelivered – The number of megawatts of electricity distributed every day 
in the country. 
DissatisfiedPeople – The number of people who are dissatisfied with the coalition. 
SatisfiedPeople – The number of people who are neutral to, or satisfied with, the coalition. 
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Appendix B: General Model Equations
Indigenous Security Institutions Sub-model Equations 
Eq. 3.1 BPRecruitRate(t) ~ BPRRDist ( ))(),( ReRe tt cruitRateBPcruitRateBP σµ    
 
Eq. 3.1a BPRecruitRate(t) ~ Poisson( )(tBPRRλ ) 
 
Eq. 3.2 CDRecruitRate(t) ~ CDRRDist ( ))(),( ReRe tt cruitRateCDcruitRateCD σµ    
 
Eq. 3.2a CDRecruitRate(t) ~ Poisson( )(tCDRRλ ) 
 
Eq. 3.3 IMRecruit Rate(t) ~ IMRRDist ( ))(),( ReRe tt cruitRateIMcruitRateIM σµ    
 
Eq. 3.3a IMRecruitRate(t) ~ Poisson( )(tIMRRλ ) 
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Eq. 3.5 CDGradRate(t) =  
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Eq. 3.6 IMGradRate(t) = 
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Eq. 3.7 BPAttritionRate(t)  ~ BPARDist ( ))(),( tt nRateBPAttritionRateBPAttritio σµ    
 
Eq. 3.8 CDAttritionRate(t) ~ CDARDist ( ))(),( tt nRateCDAttritionRateCDAttritio σµ  
 
Eq. 3.9 IMAttritionRate ~ IMARDist ( ))(),( tt nRateIMAttritionRateIMAttritio σµ    
 
Eq. 3.10 BPKIARate(t) = BPAttackEffectivenessParameter(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * 
BPCasualtyRandomVariable(t) 
 
Eq. 3.11 CDKIARate(t) =  
 CDAttackEffectivenessParameter(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * CDCasualtyRandomVariable(t)  
 
Eq. 3.12 IMKIARate(t)  =  
 IMAttackEffectivenessParameter(t) * #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * IMCasualtyRandomVariable(t) 
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Law Enforcement Sub-model Equations 
Eq. 3.13 PORecruitRate(t) ~ PORRDist ( ))(),( ReRe tt cruitRatePOcruitRatePO σµ    
 
Eq. 3.14 POGradRate(t) =  
 ( )
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
0
)(1*)( tAttritionPOTrainingtsSizePOGradClas if
otherwise
eCurrentDatthClasslengtStartDate =+ )(  
 
Eq. 3.15 POAttritionRate(t)  ~ POARDist ( ))(),( tt nRateBPAttritionRateBPAttritio σµ    
 
Eq. 3.16 POCasualtyRate(t) =  
 InsurgentAttackOnPoliceEffectParameter(t) * PoliceCasualtyRandVar(t) * #ofAttacks(t) + 
PoliceCrimeRateEffectParameter(t) * PoliceCasualtyRandVar(t) * CrimeRate(t) 
 
Eq. 3.17 CriminalRecruitRate(t) = CriminalRecruitRateInterceptParameter(t) +  
 UnemploymentEffectParameter(t) * UnemploymentLevel(t)  +  
 CriminalApprehensionRateEffectParameter(t) * CriminalApprehensionRate(t) +  
 CriminalRecruitRateDist ( ))(),( ReRe tt cruitRateCcruitRateC σµ  
 
Eq. 3.18  CriminalApprehensionRate(t) = Criminals * (PoliceEffectParameter(t) * PoliceOfficers(t) + 
CivilDefenseTroopEffectParameter(t) * CivilDefenceTroops(t)  + CMilitaryEffectParameter(t) * 
CMilitaryPolicing(t)) * CriminalApprehensionRateRandVar(t) 
 
Eq. 3.19   IncarceratedCriminalReleaseRate(t) = IncarceratedCriminal(t) * 
IncarceratedCriminalsReleaseRandVar(t) 
 
Eq. 3.20 CrimeRate(t) = CrimeRateRandVar(t) * (Criminals(t) * CrimesPerCriminal(t) +  
 Insurgents(t) * CrimesPerInsurgent(t)) 
 
Eq. 3.21 CoaltionTroopsPolicing(t) = TotalCoaltionTroops(t) * %CoalitionPolicing(t) 
 
Insurgent and Coalition Military Activities Equations 
Eq. 3.22 CoalitionTroopsInCountryRate(t) = CoalitionTroopCasualtyRate(t) 
 
Eq. 3.23 CoalitionTroopCasualtyRate(t) = InsurgentAttackOnCoalitionEffectParameter(t) * #ofAttacks(t) * 
CTCasualtyRandVar(t) 
 
Eq. 3.24 #CoalitionPatrolingBorders(t) = TotalCoaltionTroops(t) * %CoalitionPatrollingBorders(t) 
 
Eq. 3.25 #CoalitionCounterInsurgency(t) = TotalCoalitionTroops(t) * %CounterInsurgency(t) 
 
Eq. 3.26 InsurgentRateOfChange(t) =DissatisfiedPeople(t) *  
 InsurgentKilledorDetainedEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) *  
 InsurgentRateOfChangeRandVar(t) 
 
Eq. 3.27 InternationalInsurgentRate(t) = TotalInternationalInsurgentsRandVar(t) * 
(BorderPatrolEffectParameter(t) * BorderPatrolTroops(t) + 
CoalitionPatrollingBorderEffectParameter(t) * CoalitionPatrollingBorder(t))  
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Eq. 3.28 InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) =  
 Insurgents(t) * (CTroopsCounterInsurgEffectParameter(t) * CTroopsInCounterInsurg(t) + 
IMEffectParameter(t) * IndigenousMilitaryTroops(t)  + CDEffectParameter(t) * 
CivilDefenseTroops(t)) * TipsOnInsurgency(t) * InsurgentAppRandVar(t) 
 
Eq. 3.28a InsurgentDetentionRate(t) = (1-InsurgentKilledRate(t)) * InsurgentKilledOrDetainedRate(t) 
 
Eq. 3.29  InsurgentReleaseRate(t) = DetainedInsurgents(t) * InsurgentReleaseRandVar(t) 
 
Eq. 3.30 #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) = Insurgents(t) * InsurgentEffectParameter(t) * 
InsurgentAttackRandVar(t) 
 
Eq. 3.31 #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) = #OfInsurgentAttacks(t) * CDEffectParameter(t) 
* %OfAttacksOnInfrastructure(t) 
 
Labor Market Sub-model Equations 
Eq. 3.32 GovernmentHireRate(t) ~ GHRDist ( ))(),( tt teGovtHireRateGovtHireRa σµ    
 
Eq. 3.32a   GovernmentHireRate ~ Poisson( )(tteGovtHireRaλ ) 
 
Eq. 3.33 PrivateSectorHireRate(t) = RPerCapGDPGrowth(t) * RPerCapGDPEffectParameter(t)  
 * PrivateSectorHireRateRandVar(t) 
 
Eq. 3.34  PerCapRGDPGrowthRate(t) = RGDPRandVar(t) * (InsurgentAttacksEffectParameter(t) * 
#OfInsurgentAttacks(t)  + CrimeEffectParameter(t) * CrimeRate(t)  + WaterEffectParameter(t) * 
WaterShortage(t)  + FoodEffectParameter(t) * FoodShortage(t)  + FuelEffectParameter(t)* 
FuelShortage(t)  + ElectricityEffectParameter(t) * ElectricityShortage(t) + 
PreviousPerCapRGDPEffectParameter(t) *  PreviousPerCapRGDP(t))  
 
Critical Infrastructure Sub-model Equations 
Eq. 3.35 WaterShortage/Surplus(t) = GallonsOfWaterDelivered(t)  – GallonsOfWaterDemanded(t) 
 
Eq. 3.36 FoodShortage/Surplus(t) = TonsOfFoodDelivered(t)  - TonsOfFoodDemanded(t) 
 
Eq. 3.37 FuelShortage/Surplus(t)  = GallonsOfFuelDelivered(t)  - GallonsOfFuelDemanded(t) 
 
Eq. 3.38 ElectricityShortage/Surplus(t)  = MegaWattDelivered(t)  – MegaWattDemanded(t) 
 
Eq. 3.39 WaterDevelopmentRate(t)  = BaseWaterDevelopmentRate(t) * 
(InfrastructureAttackWaterEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) + 
ElectricShortageEffectParameter(t) * ElectricShortage(t)) 
 
Eq. 3.40 FoodDevelopmentRate(t) = BaseFoodDevelopmentRate(t) * 
(InfrastructureAttackFoodEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) + 
FuelShortageEffectParameter(t) * FuelShortage(t)) 
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Eq. 3.41 FuelDevelopmentRate(t)  = BaseFuelDevelopmentRate(t) * 
(InfrastructureAttackFuelEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t) + 
ElectricShortageEffectParameter(t) * ElectricShortage(t)) 
 
Eq. 3.42 ElectricDevelopmentRate = BaseElectricDevelopmentRate(t) * 
InfrastructureAttackElectricEffectParameter(t) * #OfInfrastructureAttacks(t)  
 
Public Opinion Sub-model Equations 
Eq. 3.43 PublicOpinionRateOfChange(t)  = UnemploymentEffectParameter(t)*  
 UnemploymentLevel(t) + InsurgentAttacksEffectParameter(t) * InsurgentAttacks(t) +  
 CrimeRateEffectParameter(t) * CrimeRate(t) +  
 WaterShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * WaterShortage/Surplus(t)  +  
 FoodShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * FoodShortage/Surplus(t) +  
 FuelShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * FuelShortage/Surplus(t)  +  
 ElectricShortage/SurplusEffectParameter(t) * ElectricShortage/Surplus(t) 
 
Eq. 3.44 TipsOnInsurgents(t)  = #OfPeopleSatisfiedWithOccupation(t) * TipsRandomVariable(t) 
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Appendix C: Two and Three Factor Parameter Estimates 
 
Table C.1: Single Factor Parameter Estimates and Significance 
Term   Estimate p-value 
Intercept  5.727733 <.0001 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People 0.185359 <.0001 
B: Initial Police Officers -0.02877 <.0001 
C: Initial Criminals 0.012877 <.0001 
D: Initial Insurgents 0.029326 <.0001 
E: GDP Growth Rate -0.05763 <.0001 
F: ISF Training Rates -0.04549 <.0001 
G: Infrastructure Development Rate -0.12592 <.0001 
Shaded factors are significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
 
Table C.2: Two Factor Parameter Estimates and Significance 
Term   Estimate p-value 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*B: Initial Police Officers 0.003908 0.182 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*C: Initial Criminals -0.00541 0.0655 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*D: Initial Insurgents 0.002469 0.3981 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*E: GDP Growth Rate 0.016179 <.0001 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*F: ISF Training Rates 0.000251 0.9315 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*G: Infrastructure Development Rate -0.02001 <.0001 
B: Initial Police Officers*C: Initial Criminals -0.00201 0.4913 
B: Initial Police Officers*D: Initial Insurgents -0.00047 0.8733 
B: Initial Police Officers*E: GDP Growth Rate 0.003946 0.1779 
B: Initial Police Officers*F: ISF Training Rates 0.005155 0.0791 
B: Initial Police Officers*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.001259 0.6661 
C: Initial Criminals*D: Initial Insurgents -0.00314 0.2823 
C: Initial Criminals*E: GDP Growth Rate -0.00256 0.3804 
C: Initial Criminals*F: ISF Training Rates 0.006223 0.0345 
C: Initial Criminals*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.00263 0.3682 
D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate -0.00428 0.1439 
D: Initial Insurgents*F: ISF Training Rates -0.0001 0.9722 
D: Initial Insurgents*G: Infrastructure Development Rate -0.01114 0.0002 
E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates 0.010438 0.0005 
E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.007491 0.0112 
F: ISF Training Rates*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.004346 0.138 
Shaded factors are significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
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Table C.3: Three Factor Parameter Estimates and Significance 
Term   Estimate p-value 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*B: Initial Police Officers*C: Initial Criminals -0.00144 0.6229 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*B: Initial Police Officers*D: Initial Insurgents 0.000594 0.8386 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*B: Initial Police Officers*E: GDP Growth Rate -0.00301 0.3032 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*B: Initial Police Officers*F: ISF Training Rates -0.00216 0.4597 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*B: Initial Police Officers*G: Infrastructure Development Rate -0.00155 0.5961 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*C: Initial Criminals*D: Initial Insurgents 0.001971 0.4998 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*C: Initial Criminals*E: GDP Growth Rate 0.000397 0.8918 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*C: Initial Criminals*F: ISF Training Rates -0.001 0.7315 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*C: Initial Criminals*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.002418 0.408 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate -0.00188 0.5209 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*D: Initial Insurgents*F: ISF Training Rates -0.00151 0.6054 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*D: Initial Insurgents*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.002064 0.4797 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates -0.01065 0.0004 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.00648 0.0278 
A: Initial Dissatisfied People*F: ISF Training Rates*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.005181 0.0776 
B: Initial Police Officers*C: Initial Criminals*D: Initial Insurgents 0.001102 0.7059 
B: Initial Police Officers*C: Initial Criminals*E: GDP Growth Rate -0.00397 0.1755 
B: Initial Police Officers*C: Initial Criminals*F: ISF Training Rates 0.001538 0.5983 
B: Initial Police Officers*C: Initial Criminals*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.001823 0.5323 
B: Initial Police Officers*D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate -0.00075 0.7985 
B: Initial Police Officers*D: Initial Insurgents*F: ISF Training Rates -0.0016 0.5845 
B: Initial Police Officers*D: Initial Insurgents*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.002461 0.3997 
B: Initial Police Officers*E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates 0.001812 0.5349 
B: Initial Police Officers*E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.000838 0.774 
B: Initial Police Officers*F: ISF Training Rates*G: Infrastructure Development Rate -0.00048 0.8703 
C: Initial Criminals*D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate 0.000381 0.8962 
C: Initial Criminals*D: Initial Insurgents*F: ISF Training Rates -0.00445 0.129 
C: Initial Criminals*D: Initial Insurgents*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.001971 0.4997 
C: Initial Criminals*E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates 0.001768 0.5449 
C: Initial Criminals*E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.005516 0.0605 
C: Initial Criminals*F: ISF Training Rates*G: Infrastructure Development Rate -0.00073 0.8032 
D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates -0.00841 0.0046 
D: Initial Insurgents*E: GDP Growth Rate*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.005431 0.0645 
D: Initial Insurgents*F: ISF Training Rates*G: Infrastructure Development Rate -0.00054 0.8533 
E: GDP Growth Rate*F: ISF Training Rates*G: Infrastructure Development Rate 0.00354 0.2264 
Shaded factors are significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
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